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According to one standard semantic definition of a contradiction, a sentence is a 
contradiction if (and only if) it is false in every model, whereas a sentence is a 
tautology if (and only if) it is true in every model.  This dissertation explores three 
reinterpretations of these definitions, each of which seeks to extend the coverage of 
these definitions to new phenomena in natural language.  The first reinterpretation 
excludes all models in which a term is undefined, and is used to classify certain 
Existential There Sentences as either contradictions or tautologies.  The second 
reinterpretation excludes the very few models in which a sentence whose subject is a 
but-phrase that is headed by a non-universal determiner is true.  The final 
reinterpretation requires that we shift our focus from models, to the more inclusive 
concept of an interpretation, and classifies a sentence whose meaning is compatible 
with only one interpretation that is always false as a contradiction.  An example of this 
strategy is any statement of support for the position that all quantification is restricted 
in natural language, e.g. I am not quantifying over everything.  The dominant focus of 
these reinterpretations has been the behaviour of the data in the sanctioned models (or 
interpretations).  A strategy, I will argue, that does not yield nearly as much insight 
into the semantic properties of natural language as a close study of these constructions 
in the excluded models (or interpretations).  The topics covered include the odd truth 
value assignment to Existential There Sentences in which a term is undefined, the 
influence of Grice’s maxims of conversation on the distribution of DPs in but-phrases,  
and the possibly related phenomenon of sentences in which the subject is modified by 
a sentence initial only, and finally, the impossibility of expressing the content of the 
view that all quantification is restricted in natural language.  
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 
 
…the declared meaning of a spoken sentence is only its overcoat, 
 … the real meaning lies underneath its scarves and buttons. 
Peter Carey, Oscar and Lucinda 
 
 
 
0.  Of Contradictions and Tautologies 
 
 
  As intuitively obvious as the notion of a contradiction may appear, there is no 
commonly agreed upon definition.  Of the many possibilities, there are two common, but 
competing definitions.
1  The first is semantic in nature since it defines a contradiction in 
terms of the semantic notions of truth and falsity.  Although there is a wide range of 
possible wordings, one that appears to be the popular with many formal semanticists and 
philosophers is one that makes reference to models: 
 
 
                                                 
1 Two other plausible, but uncommon possibilities are the metaphysical and pragmatic definitions.   
Aristotle provides the best known example of a metaphysical definition in his discussion of the Law of 
Non-Contradiction: 
 
Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to 
say.  It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same 
subject and in the same respect… 
 
   Aristotle,  Metaphysics Γ (c. 350 BC), 1011
b13-14 in Grim, 2004; 48-49 
 
The other possibility, pragmatic, defines a contradiction as a sentence that is simultaneously asserted and 
denied by the speaker.  The first definition has the obvious drawback of being obscure.  It is far from clear 
what it is for a property to ‘belong’ to a subject. The other appears to equivocate between a sentence being 
negated and a sentence being denied.  The problem with this equivocation, as first observed by Ayer (1952) 
and later reiterated in Horn (1989), is that the status of certain sentences as negative does not seem to rely 
on whether they have been uttered and hence, denied.  Likewise, the status of certain statements as 
contradictions does not appear to rely on whether they have been uttered, and hence asserted and denied.  
Given these difficulties, the lack of interest in these alternatives is not surprising. 
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1.  A sentence is a contradiction if (and only if) it is false in every model.
2 
 
The other widely used definition is one that focuses on the form of the sentence and 
hence is formal in nature.
3  This approach, which is especially popular within the 
confines of logic, defines a contradiction as the conjunction of a statement and its 
negation:   
 
 
2.  Φ ∧ ¬Φ 
 
As appealing as the formal definition of a contradiction may be in virtue of its simplicity, 
the semantic definition has many advantages.  First, the semantic definition subsumes the 
formal definition.  Every sentence that meets the formal definition of a contradiction will 
also meet the semantic definition, whereas the converse is not true.  Second, the semantic 
definition covers more data.  Although (3) does not meet the formal definition, it appears 
to be as contradictory as (4), which does meet this definition: 
 
 
 
3.  Paris is not Paris. 
4.  Paris is in France and Paris is not in France. 
 
 
Finally, unlike the formal definition, the semantic definition of a contradiction has a 
natural counterpart for the related category of a tautology
4: 
                                                 
2 There is some controversy about whether it is a sentence or a proposition that is the bearer of truth.  
Although I use the term sentence throughout the introduction, nothing stated here is inconsistent with the 
possibility that propositions are the bearers of truth.  The use of sentence is not intended to prejudge this 
question.    
3 The formal definition may also be referred to as the syntactic definition.  But as Brian Weatherson (p.c.) 
has pointed out to me, this secondary name is somewhat misleading.  The semantic definition also 
incorporates notions that are syntactic in nature, making it difficult to distinguish between these two 
definitions in virtue of their names alone.  Although the term formal is also prone to this problem, I will 
continue to use it because it is the better of the two choices. 
4 The natural counterpart of the formal definition of a contradiction would be a definition that defines a 
tautology as: Φ ∨ ¬Φ.  To my knowledge, no one has ever advocated this as a definition of a tautology in 
natural language.  
  3
 
5.  A sentence is a tautology if (and only if) it is true in every model. 
 
 
Thus, it is the semantic definitions of both a contradiction and a tautology that will be 
used in this dissertation. 
  Although less restrictive than its formal counterpart, the semantic definitions of 
contradictions and tautologies have nevertheless not satisfied many researchers.  They 
have been subject to a variety of reinterpretations in an effort to expand their reach to 
cover more data in natural language.  The easiest manner in which to achieve this goal is 
to restrict the domain of quantification associated with every model.  Three of these 
interpretative strategies will play a central role in this dissertation.     
  The first, and by far most popular, excludes any model from consideration in 
which a constituent of the given sentence is undefined.  An excellent example of this 
approach can be found in Barwise and Cooper’s well-known test for classifying a 
determiner as either strong or weak: 
 
 
 
To classify a determiner D as (1) positive strong, (2) negative strong or (3) weak, 
you form a simple sentence of the form 
 
D N is a N/are Ns 
 
And see if it is judged (1) automatically valid, (2) contradictory or (3) contingent 
on the interpretation.  For example, every gnu is a gnu is true in every model, 
neither gnu is a gnu is false in every model in which it is defined and many 
gnus are gnus will be true just in case there are many gnus.  These judgments 
classify every, neither and many as positive strong, negative strong and weak, 
respectively.
 5 
 
 
According to Barwise and Cooper, neither gnu is only defined in a model where there are 
                                                 
5 Barwise and Cooper, 1981; 182: emphasis added  
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exactly two gnus.  Thus, this sentence is only a contradiction if we limit our attention to 
models with exactly two gnus. 
  The second, and by far, most experimental reinterpretation of the semantic 
definition of a contradiction is found in von Fintel’s (1997) discussion of but-phrases.  He 
notes that but-phrases headed by determiners that are not universal in force are false in 
almost all models.  As sentences that are so rarely true, and thus essentially contradictory, 
they may have been rendered unacceptable, perhaps via a process of grammaticalization.  
Thus, in this case, the (few) models that are excluded from the discussion are those in 
which the sentence is true. 
  Finally, at the most extreme end of the spectrum, is an reinterpretation that 
excludes all models, or in this case, excludes all interpretations,
6 that are not compatible 
with the intended meaning of a sentence – a meaning that is, incidentally, false under its 
sole interpretation. Williamson (2003) provides an example of this approach: 
 
6.  I am not quantifying over everything. 
 
If (6) is uttered by an individual that rejects the possibility of unrestricted quantification, 
then it appears that this statement can only be true if the speaker assumes the very thing 
she is denying – unrestricted quantification.  The simultaneous commitment to and 
rejection of the same belief allows us to derive the following contradiction from an 
utterance of (6): 
 
7.  I am not quantifying over everything and I am quantifying over everything. 
 
                                                 
6 Because models are only compatible with a restricted domain of quantification, it is necessary to 
substitute the broader concept of an interpretation in this part of the discussion in order to avoid prejudging 
the question of whether unrestricted quantification is possible.  
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As a result, according to Williamson, any utterance of (6) must be false because the 
speaker is actually quantifying over everything.  Thus, this sentence is a contradiction 
because it is false under the only interpretation that is compatible with its intended 
meaning. 
  With each reinterpretation of the semantic definition of a contradiction or a 
tautology, the focus of attention is always on the behaviour of the given phenomenon 
within the sanctioned models.  This is unfortunate.  On closer inspection, it is often on the 
fringes, i.e. within those models that are excluded, that these phenomena yield their most 
intriguing insights into the semantic properties of language.  This dissertation will 
attempt to take advantage of this observation by focusing on the behaviour of these 
phenomena in those models (or more broadly, under those interpretations) that have been 
discarded.   
  Each chapter will introduce a phenomenon (or as is the case in chapter three, 
phenomena) and the attending semantic definition of either a contradiction or tautology 
that is adopted.  The phenomena are as follows.  In chapter two, the focus of attention is 
on the distribution of DPs in Existential There Sentences.  In chapter three, it is the 
distribution of DPs in but-phrases and only-initial sentences.  Finally, chapter four will 
explore the problem of unrestricted quantification, with a particular focus on the question 
of whether it is possible to express a commitment to restricted quantification in natural 
language.   
In each of these cases, either the phenomenon itself or a certain subset of the 
phenomenon has been classified as a contradiction or a tautology under one of the three 
aforementioned reinterpretations of the semantic definitions of a contradiction or a 
tautology.  I will focus particular attention on the behaviour of each of these respective 
phenomena in relation to the excluded models (or as is necessary in the case of the final 
chapter, excluded interpretations).  Some of the topics that will be discussed include the 
odd truth values assigned to Existential There Sentences in which a constituent is  
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undefined; the possible influence that persistent violations of Grice’s maxims of 
conversations may have on the acceptability of certain sentences; and finally, the 
impossibility of actually expressing the content of the position of restricted 
quantification.  As even this brief survey hopefully demonstrates, this strategy has the 
potential to lead to some very exciting conclusions about the properties of natural 
language. 
Below, I provide a more detailed introduction to each chapter of this dissertation. 
 
1.  Chapter Two – Keenan’s Definition 
 
Chapter two of this dissertation focuses on a well-known problem: the distribution 
of determiners in Existential There Sentences.  These are characterized by the following 
division in their acceptability: 
 
 
8.  There are some/many/few/no/two children in the garden. 
9.  ??There is every/each/the/that/ChiSook’s child in the garden. 
10.  ??There are most children in the garden. 
 
 
Existential There Sentences that contain determiners in the first class, i.e. the weak 
determiners of Barwise and Cooper, are acceptable while those in the second class, i.e. 
the strong determiners, are not.  Complicating the data is the fact that certain examples 
containing strong determiners, e.g. every,  each,  that and the, are acceptable within 
specific constructions such as superlatives or as part of a list.  These distributional facts 
lead to two natural questions: first, what is the relation of the exceptions to the core data, 
and second, why are some of these sentences unacceptable. 
  My response to these two questions draws heavily on the work of Keenan (2003).  
I argue that DPs in the subject position of an acceptable sentence must meet one of the  
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two following conditions: 1) be headed by a determiner that has the property of being 
conservative2, as defined by Keenan, or 2) be incompatible with a denotation of type 
<<et>,t>, i.e. do not denote a set of sets.  DPs that characterize the core data generally 
fulfill the first condition, whereas the DPs of the exceptional data generally fulfill the 
second.  DPs in unacceptable sentences fail to meet either condition, i.e. they contain a 
DP that is not headed by a determiner that is conservative2 and they have a denotation of 
type <<et>,t>.  With the full generality of Keenan’s definition restored, a remarkable 
pattern among these sentences emerges: they are true even in those models that are 
excluded from the discussion because the DP in the post-copular subject position is 
undefined, i.e. denotes the empty set.  The behaviour of these sentences in these formerly 
excluded models is odd; other examples of sentences that contain similarly undefined 
DPs are either judged false or to lack a truth value.  This result suggests that the 
unacceptability of at least some ETS may be due to this anomalous truth value 
assignment. 
 
2.  Chapter Three – But , Only and Grice’s Maxims of Conversation 
 
  The third chapter focuses on two different phenomena: sentences in which the 
subject is an exception phrase that contain the term but and what I term only-initial 
sentences.  But-phrases have two very interesting distributional requirements.  The first is 
that the initial DP of these phrases must be headed by a universal determiner: 
 
  
 
11.  Every/No student but ChiSook. 
12.  *Some/Many/Most/Few students but ChiSook and John 
 
 
Additionally, the complement DP is limited to proper names, indefinite descriptions,  
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definite descriptions and certain cardinals. 
  A similar observation has been made in relation to only-initial sentences (see von 
Fintel 2000 and Moltmann 1995).  The subject of these sentences is usually limited to 
DPs that are proper names, indefinite descriptions, definite descriptions and certain 
cardinals.  In rare cases, a DP that is of type <<et>,t> is permitted, but this requires the 
presence of an overtly contrasting DP of the same type: 
 
 
 
13.  Does every student smoke? 
14.  ?Only many/most/few students smoke. 
 
 
There are consequently some important points of contact between these two 
constructions: a shared preference for proper names, indefinite descriptions, definite 
descriptions and certain cardinals in certain positions and an idiosyncratic restriction on 
the distribution of DPs of type <<et>,t>. 
  The task of explaining the nature of these restrictions is broken into two separate 
problems.  The first is the obvious preference for DPs that are proper names, indefinite 
descriptions, definite descriptions and certain cardinals.  What all of these categories of 
expressions share in common is an extreme flexibility in the type assignment of their 
denotation.  Each is compatible with a denotation that is of type <e>, i.e. an individual, 
type <et>, i.e. a set, and type <<et>,t>, i.e. a set of sets.  In the case of but, this flexibility 
is required because but is only compatible with DPs that have a denotation of type <et> 
and type <<et>,t>.  Only, in contrast, generally requires a complement whose denotation 
is either of type <e> or type <et> in an only-initial sentence.  The perceived similarity in 
the distribution of these expressions is thus the result of a much more general property 
that each of these expressions share: type flexibility. 
  The second part of the chapter focuses on the odd distributional pattern of DPs of  
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type <<et>,t> in these two constructions.  In the case of but-phrases, the distribution 
pattern that requires an explanation is the constraint on the head of the first DP to a 
determiner that is universal in force.  For only-initial sentences, DPs of type <<et>,t> are 
only licit if they are explicitly contrasted with another DP of this type.  The unacceptable 
examples of each of these phenomena share an important property: they are false in 
many, but not all models.  This fact has led von Fintel to suggest that, at least in the case 
of  but-phrases, it may be this ‘contradictory’ status that is at the heart of their 
unacceptability.  I argue that this focus on the models in which these sentences are false 
is misplaced; it is the behaviour of these sentences in the models in which they are true 
that is by far more important.  Sentences in which the subject is an ill-formed but-phrase 
are only true under very specific conditions: models in which there are at least two 
individuals and the sole exception is the individual that is the denotation of the direct 
argument of but.  In other words, these sentences are only true in those models in which a 
similar sentence with a but-phrase headed by a positive universal determiner in subject 
position would also be true.  This suggests that the unacceptability of these sentences 
may be due to a violation of Grice’s maxims of conversation: Quantity.  The maxim of 
Quantity requires that a speaker should be neither more nor less informative than the 
occasion demands.  Any attempt to use a sentence in which the subject is an ill-formed 
but-phrase violates this maxim as another, more informative formulation of the sentence 
always exists, viz. one in which the subject is replaced by a but-phrase that is headed by a 
positive universal determiner.  The only other option for the speaker is to use these 
sentences to utter something that is false – a strategy that would violate another maxim of 
Grice: Quality.  Thus, any attempt to use a sentence in which the subject is an ill-formed 
but-phrase appears to result in a violation of at least one of Grice’s maxims.  
Although interesting, a violation of one of Grice’s maxims of conversation does 
not generally result in an utterance being judged unacceptable.  There is, consequently, an 
open question about whether such violations could really affect the distribution of DPs in  
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a construction.  I turn to a similar phenomena to provide more evidence that this is indeed 
the case: the distribution of DPs of type <<et>,t> in only-initial sentences.  For one 
particular use of only-initial sentences, the context is unable to provide a clear set of 
alternatives for interpretation.  This results in an utterance whose truth value cannot be 
easily assessed, making it very difficult for the speaker to observe the conversational 
maxim of Quality, i.e. to try and say only what you know to be true.  The resulting failure 
of this maxim, and the attending unacceptability of only-initial sentences in which the DP 
has a base denotation of type <<et>,t>, suggests that once again, a violation of Grice’s 
maxims of conversation may be responsible for the observed distribution of data.   
Although only-initial sentences offer some intriguing evidence of the role that Grice’s 
maxims may play in explaining the unacceptability of certain utterances, this explanation 
is incomplete.  An answer to the question of why consistent violations result in 
unacceptability, while occasional violations only result in an utterance that is stylistically 
marked is still needed. 
 
3.  Chapter Four: Silent Opposition 
 
  Williamson (2003) claims that those that reject unrestricted quantification, or as 
he calls them, the generality relativists, are unable to state their position without 
assuming unrestricted quantification.  To prove his point, he derives a contradiction from 
a statement of their position, (6) repeated below for convenience,  
  
15.  I am not quantifying over everything. 
 
standard truth conditions and logical rules.  In order to generate a contradiction from (15), 
the domain of quantification associated with everything must be completely unrestricted.  
Williamson assumes that he can guarantee this interpretation on the basis of the speaker’s  
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intentions alone – an assumption that I argue is unwarranted.  With no manner in which 
to guarantee the needed domain of quantification, it is no longer possible to guarantee 
that (15) is false.  Thus, (15) can not be classified as a contradiction under Williamson’s 
reinterpretation of the semantic definition of this concept and is no longer a prima facie 
threat to the coherency of the generality relativist’s position. 
  Although the generality relativist is no longer threatened by the possibility of a 
contradiction, the statement of her position is still rife with problems.  If she is to 
maintain her commitment to restricted quantification, then she can never express the 
content of her view.  All other interpretations of (15), i.e. those that were formerly 
excluded from consideration, are not compatible with the needed meaning.  She is, in 
effect, silenced.  Silence may seem like an extraordinary cost to pay to maintain a 
theoretical position, but she is not alone in her difficulties. 
  The advocate of unrestricted quantification, or the generality absolutist, still must 
contend with Russell’s paradox.  Williamson provides his own version of the paradox and 
demonstrates that with only the assumption of unrestricted quantification and the 
standard rules of logic that it is possible to generate the contradiction in which an 
interpretation applies to a predicate if and only if it does not apply to that predicate.  
Unlike the previous case, this sentence meets the standard semantic definition of a 
contradiction, and accordingly, is substantially more difficult to dislodge.  
I discuss two possible solutions to this paradox: Williamson (2003) and Rayo 
(2006).  Of the two, Rayo’s is more convincing.  Rayo argues that the best way to resolve 
Russell’s paradox is to conduct all semantic theorizing in a language that is of a higher 
type.  In the case of Williamson’s version of the paradox, interpretations – a term that is 
part of our metalanguage – must belong to a language of a higher type, i.e. a second-order 
language.  As part of a second-order language, interpretations are easily classified as 
second-order terms – a classification that blocks an important step in the generation of the 
contradiction of Williamson’s version of Russell’s paradox.  
  12
  Although the generality absolutist is able to dodge the full effects of Russell’s 
paradox, there is a cost to be paid.  The fact that semantic theorizing about an object 
language must always be carried out in a language of a higher type leads to an ever 
ascending hierarchy of types of languages.  Faced with a request to interpret certain 
predicates in his language, the generality absolutist will be forced to either end the 
process of interpretation at some arbitrary point or carry out the process of interpretation 
forever.  Regardless of which choice he makes, the generality absolutist is unable to 
escape the conclusion that it is his and not the generality relativist’s position that is the 
real threat to the project of semantic theorizing.  This is a problem, which according to 
Williamson, should given any philosopher of language pause for thought.  Consequently, 
if we heed Williamson’s warning, it is unrestricted quantification and not restricted 
quantification that is the more costly, and hence less attractive of the two positions.  
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Chapter Two: 
Keenan’s Definition 
 
 
 
0.  Introduction 
 
  In his seminal 2003 paper, Keenan seeks to provide a purely semantic definition 
of the class of determiners that are compatible with Existential There Sentences (ETS).  
The core of the data is standardly assumed to include the weak determiners of Milsark 
(1974; 1977): 
 
1.  There are some/many/few/no/two children in the garden. 
 
The so-called weak determiners in (1) are fine in the post-copular position of an ETS, 
whereas universals and definites, i.e. the strong determiners of Milsark, appear to be 
unacceptable in this construction: 
 
 
2.  ??There is every/each child in the garden. 
3.  ??There is the/that/ChiSook’s child in the garden. 
 
In addition to universals and definites, we can also include the proportional determiners, 
such as most, among the list of strong determiners: 
 
  4.  ??There are most children in the garden. 
 
Keenan’s initial assumption is that all weak determiners are the head of a DP that is a 
generalized quantifier (GQ), a function that takes a set of subsets of objects of a given 
domain E, and maps it onto either True or False.  A property of all natural language  
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monophonemic determiners is that they are conservative,
1  which is defined by Keenan 
as,  
 
 
A map D from PE into GQE,X is conservative on its first argument (cons1) iff A ∩ 
B =  A ∩ B’ ⇒  DAB = DAB’, for all A, B, B’ ⊆  E.
2 
 
 
where E is the domain and PE are the subsets of E.
3  Keenan shows that this definition can 
be further refined.  The above definition states what is required for a determiner to be 
conservative on its first argument, but a determiner may be conservative in relation to 
more than just one argument.  It may also be conservative in relation to the second 
argument.
4  Keenan refers to this property as conservativity2, i.e. conservative on the 
second argument:
5 
 
 
 
A map D from PE into GQE,X is conservative on its second argument (cons2) iff A 
∩ B =  A’ ∩ B ⇒  DAB = DA’B, for all A, A’, B ⊆  E.
6 
 
 
Keenan claims that this is the property that distinguishes the class of weak determiners 
from their strong counterparts: the former, but not the latter are conservative in relation to 
their second argument.  Weak determiners, therefore, are defined as those that have the 
                                                 
1 Keenan identifies three possible exceptions to this claim: only, just and mostly.  These expressions are not 
conservative on their first argument.  Although Keenan categorizes them as determiners, their distribution 
differs a great deal from standard examples of determiners.  Their inclusion in this category is, therefore, 
open to doubt. I will not include these three expressions in the discussion and adapt my presentation of 
Keenan’s main thesis accordingly. 
2 Keenan, 2003; 199 
3 Keenan also includes the more standard statement of this property: DAB = DAA ∩ B, for all A, B. 
4 Conservativity, in fact, can be defined in relation to any argument of a determiner.  But because the usual 
examples of DPs headed by weak determiners are limited to those with only two arguments, Keenan limits 
his attention to determiners that have the property of being conservative2. 
5 The more standard notation for this property is: DAB = DA ∩ BB for all A, B. 
6 Keenan, 2003; 200  
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property of being conservative2.
7    
  Keenan’s definition has two central strengths.  First, it permits a simple and 
straightforward semantic analysis of ETS.  The pleonastic subject there is semantically 
vacuous and the semantic content of an existential sentence is equivalent to that of a 
sentence in which the property denoted by the second argument of the ETS, or what is 
sometimes referred to as the coda, is predicated of the internal noun phrase(s).
8  His 
analysis of ETS predicts that the two following sentences have the same truth conditions, 
 
 
 
5.  There are some children in the garden. 
6.  Some children are in the garden. 
 
 
but that the (post-copular) subject of the former, an ETS, is headed by a determiner that 
adheres to Keenan’s definition, while the latter is not. 
  Second, it is precise.  Keenan is able to offer a complete specification of the class 
of determiners that have the property of being conservative2.  And as he notes each of 
these determiners heads a DP that is acceptable in ETS, he concludes that he has also 
defined the class of weak determiners.  But it is here – the substitution of the class of 
determiners that are conservative in relation to each of their arguments for the class of 
weak determiners – that his argument encounters its first major setback.  Although all 
DPs headed by determiners that have the property of being conservative2 are acceptable 
in ETS, not all acceptable ETS contain a DP that is headed by a determiner that is 
conservative in relation to both of its arguments.   
There are many examples to choose from, but I will stick to what I term the 
standard  exceptions.  A standard exception must meet the following two conditions.   
                                                 
7 A nice feature of his definition of conservative2 is that it is closed under Boolean operations, allowing 
Keenan to extend his definition to complex determiners, assuring a complete specification of the class of 
weak determiners. 
8 The relevant truth conditions are: For all models M, [[BE, DPThere, Coda]]
M = [[BE]]
M ([[DPThere]]
M 
([[Coda]]
M)), (Keenan, 2003; 206).  
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First,  
 
i.  The ETS must be interpreted existentially.  
 
The aim of this condition is to not only exclude sentences that are obviously irrelevant to 
the discussion such as those in which the there is interpreted as indicating a location, but 
to guarantee the widest possible definition of ETS.  A sentence should not be excluded 
from the class of ETS simply because it is rarely used or requires a non-standard 
intonation.  Second, 
  
ii.  The acceptability of the counterexample should be uncontroversial. 
 
There are ETS for which no consensus exists about whether they are acceptable or not.  I 
will exclude these examples in order to present the strongest case possible for my 
analysis.
9   
Of the remaining exceptions, three categories of ETS bear directly on Keenan’s 
definition.  The first, discussed at length in Ward and Birner (1995), are definites that are 
both uniquely identifiable and denote an individual that is assumed to be hearer-new, i.e. 
a definite that denotes an individual who the speaker believes to be unknown to the 
                                                 
9  Two categories of ETS that fail this latter condition are partitives and the proportional reading of few and 
many in some ETS: 
 
7.  ??There are most of the students in the room. 
8.  ??There are many speakers of Basque that are citizens of Spain.  (proportional reading)    
 
In the first case, there are varying intuitions about the acceptability of partitives containing most. McNally 
(1998) rejects them outright (McNally, 1998: 372), while Comorovski (1991) includes them among her 
data.  I personally find many examples to be of borderline acceptability regardless of whether they include 
most, and therefore will exclude them from this discussion.  Opinions about the proportional reading of 
many and few are similarly divided.  McNally and Keenan reject them outright, while Herberger (1997) 
finds some acceptable.  As there is no clear evidence that unambiguously supports the existence of a 
proportional reading for a sentence such as (8), I will also exclude this category of expression from the 
discussion.  
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hearer.
10  This category includes superlatives and a lexically restricted group in which the 
definite contains the adjective usual or its synonyms (examples cited by Ward and Birner 
include same, regular, traditional, and expected)
11: 
 
 
 
  9.  There was the tallest boy in my history class at the party last night. 
10.  There was the usual crowd at the beach today.
12 
 
 
The second are the kind terms of McNally (1998): 
 
 
                                                 
10 There are three other members of this group that Ward and Birner identify:  hearer-old entities newly 
instantiating a variable, hearer-old entities treated as hearer-new, and false definites.  The first category is 
usually referred to as the list interpretation and in this paper is discussed separately from definites as it may 
include other quantified expressions.  The second category, sometimes called reminder contexts, will be 
discussed with the list interpretation for reasons that I discuss in section three.  The final category includes 
examples such as,  
 
 
11.  There was this huge sheet of ice on the street. 
12.  There is the most curious discussion of them in our paper. 
13.  There is every reason to study them. 
  
       (Ward  and  Birner,  1995;  738-39) 
 
False definites appear to be restricted to a few idiomatic expressions and are distinguished by the fact that 
the definite (or universal) heading the DP can be replaced by an indefinite (or cardinal) determiner with no 
loss of meaning.  This has led some researchers such as Rando and Napoli (1978) and Ward and Birner 
(1995) to assume that these expressions are in fact headed by a determiner that is in some relevant sense 
weak.  Although a paraphrase containing a weak determiner is often possible, it is very unclear what the 
relationship between this paraphrase and the actual meaning of these sentences is.  The use of a DP headed 
by a strong determiner appears to be non-literal and designed to emphasize a given property of an object by 
exaggerating some dimension of it.  Thus in (11) the hugeness of the ice is emphasized in virtue of its 
uniqueness; in (12), the speaker overstates the curiousness of the argument by using a superlative; while in 
(13) the quantity of the reasons is exaggerated.  Although the relation between the non-literal interpretation 
of these DPs and their more prosaic semantic meaning is a fascinating question, it will not be addressed any 
further in this paper. 
11 Ward and Birner include another set of examples – definites whose referent is inferable – with this group.  
Definites that are inferable include adjectives such as ideal,  correct, perfect,  necessary, and required.  
Unlike definites containing usual and its synonyms, it is not clear what it is to be an inferable adjective and 
why some and not others are acceptable in ETS.  The class is, therefore, not well-defined and will not be 
discussed here with the caveat that I do not think they constitute an exception to my general strategy as it is 
highly likely that my explanation of why definites that contain the term usual or its synonyms could be 
extended to this class. 
12 Ward and Birner, 1995; 737, 733  
  18
14.  There was every kind of doctor at the convention.
13 
 
These expressions include the term kind or its synonyms in the DP.  The final is the list 
interpretation of Rando and Napoli (1978).  These utterances are distinguished by having 
a distinctive list intonation that rises at the end if the list is incomplete and falls if the list 
is complete: 
 
 
15.  Q:  How could we get there? 
       A:  Well, there’s the trolley…
14 
 
16.  And there’s two components in [Division H], which is the operations 
division: the people that do the flight activity planning procedures work, provide 
for the crew activity planning and the time line support and integrated procedures 
development and overall flight data file management; and then there is the 
payload support folks,
15 
 
 
All of these exceptions contain a post-copular subject that is headed by a determiner that 
is not conservative in relation to all of its arguments, and hence is not weak according to 
Keenan’s definition. 
  Keenan is aware that there are exceptions to his definition and attempts to head 
off this problem in two ways.  The first is to narrow the scope of the relevant data by fiat.  
For example, he excludes the kind terms of McNally on the basis of the fact that they are 
‘different’.
16  Without further justification, this is a clearly unsatisfactory response.  His 
second strategy is to narrow the definition of ETS to those that retain their core 
propositional meaning under certain permutations such as polar questioning and negation: 
 
 
 
17.  Are there many children in the garden? 
                                                 
13 McNally, 1998; 358 
14 Rando and Napoli, 1978; 300 
15 Ward and Birner, 1995; 734 
16 Keenan, 2003; 187  
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18.  There are not many children in the garden. 
 
 
Unfortunately, this test gives mixed results at best.  It appears to exclude the list 
interpretation of Rando and Napoli and the definites of Ward and Birner.  It also excludes 
ETS that contain DPs headed by clearly cardinal determiners: 
 
19.  ??There are not two children in the garden. 
 
With no clear conception of what constitutes an ETS, it is unclear what Keenan has in 
fact defined.  This problem not only threatens the modest goal of Keenan to define the 
class of DPs that are compatible with ETS, but also any larger role that this definition 
might play in an explanation of the syntactic and semantic properties of ETS. 
  As a consequence, the aim of this paper is to solve the problem that the exceptions 
pose to Keenan’s definition of weak determiners.  The key to solving this problem is to 
realize that although Keenan is correct in his assertion that all post-copular subjects that 
denote a set of sets, i.e. are of type <<et>,t>, are headed by a determiner that is 
conservative in relation to its second argument, he is not correct in his assumption that 
only expressions of this type are compatible with ETS.  I will argue that expressions that 
denote individuals, i.e. of type <e>, and expressions that denote sets, i.e. of type <et>, 
and even those that quantify over properties, i.e. of type <<et>,t>t>, are acceptable in the 
post-copular subject position, but only if the expression lacks a denotation of type 
<<et>,t>.  In other words, if we restrict the scope of Keenan’s definition to expressions of 
type <<et>,t>, the exceptional definites of Ward and Birner, the kind terms of McNally 
and the list interpretation of Rando and Napoli do not constitute counterexamples to it.  
As they are not counterexamples, there is no reason to exclude them from the data. 
  This paper is divided into three main sections.  The first section offers an 
overview of Partee’s arguments for attributing multiple denotations to DPs such as proper  
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names, indefinites and definites.  It will also summarize her claims about the relation of 
different denotations to definite descriptions.  I question the exact mix of denotations that 
she assigns to definite descriptions and suggest that it should be replaced with a set of 
denotations in which both existence and uniqueness are presupposed instead of entailed.  
Evidence is offered that the sole definites that entail existence and uniqueness are the 
exceptions of Ward and Birner, i.e. superlatives and definites that include usual or its 
synonyms.  I argue that these expressions are different than standard examples of definite 
descriptions in virtue of their meaning: their referent is always unique and hence 
uniqueness is plausibly entailed by this class of definites.  With two classes of definites 
identified, it is possible to show that the latter class, i.e. the exceptional definites of Ward 
and Birner, not the former, i.e. the standard examples of definites, lack a denotation of 
type <<et>,t>.  Therefore, they are not counterexamples to Keenan’s definition. 
  The second section focuses on two categories of counterexamples: kind terms and 
the list interpretation.  What binds these examples together is that the existential 
predicate, i.e. there is/are, is of a higher type, and hence, has a slightly different meaning 
than the existential predicate of Keenan.  Because the predicate in these examples is of a 
higher type, it is not compatible with expressions whose denotation is of type <<et>,t>.  
Drawing heavily from the work of McNally (1998), I will argue that kind terms adhere to 
this condition.  This conclusion is extended to cover the list interpretation, demonstrating 
once again that these ETS do not pose a challenge to Keenan’s definition.   
With the relationship of the standard exceptions to the core data explained, we are 
in a position to conclude (at least provisionally) that Keenan has in fact provided a fully 
general definition of the class of weak determiners.  This result raises an immediate and 
obvious question: what motivates this particular distribution of DPs in ETS?  I spend the 
final moments of the paper highlighting a property that many of the unacceptable ETS 
share in common and outline the beginnings of one possible response to this question. 
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1.  The Type-Shifting Principles of Partee 
 
Montague (1973) offers an elegant yet ultimately unsatisfactory analysis of DPs.  
He identifies three types of denotations that can plausibly be assigned to DPs.  The first is 
type <e> and denotes an individual.  This denotation is usually reserved for referring 
expressions such as proper names.  The second is type <et>.  It denotes a set of 
individuals and applies to a DP that is predicative in nature.  The final and highest type is 
<<et>,t>, which denotes a set of sets.  Montague proposes a uniform treatment of DPs in 
which all are assigned the highest type, <<et>,t>, thereby greatly simplifying the 
semantic analysis of these expressions with no loss of explanatory power for his theory. 
Partee and Rooth (1983) and Partee (1986) raise serious questions about the 
efficacy of a uniform treatment of DPs.  In particular, Partee (1986) argues that there is a 
range of data in English that supports the assignment of multiple denotations to certain 
DPs.  A denotation of type <e> for certain expressions is both obvious and natural; 
empirical evidence for this claim exists, but only partially.  Partee cites the claim by both 
Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) that only expressions which are individual denoting terms 
may be the antecedent of a singular discourse antecedent: 
 
 
 
20.  John/the man/a man walked in.  He looked tired. 
21.  Every man/more than one man walked in.  *He looked tired.
17 
 
 
A denotation of type <e>, however, is not necessarily limited to DPs that are singular.  
Link’s (1983) semantic analysis of plurals provides evidence of the need for a denotation 
of type <e> for these expressions too.  He not only provides a simple and elegant 
explanation of the relationship between singular and plural nouns, but of a surprising 
                                                 
17 Partee, 1986; 119  
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range of data.
18  Combining these theoretical considerations, the above evidence with the 
sheer plausibility of the existence of individual denoting terms in natural language 
provides strong motivation for the necessity of an <e> type denotation for certain DPs. 
  In contrast, the case for a predicative interpretation of certain DPs can be made on 
empirical grounds alone.  The conjunction test provides central, although incomplete, 
evidence for the need to assign a denotation of type <et> to certain expressions.  If we 
assume, as most semanticists do, that adjectives are of type <et> and further, that only 
expressions of the same type can be conjoined, then the fact that adjectives may be 
conjoined to definite and indefinite descriptions demonstrates that those expressions have 
a denotation of type <et>: 
 
 
 
22.  He is smart and an expert on unicorns/the expert on unicorns.
19 
23.  *They are nice and every/more than one expert on unicorns.  
 
 
However, the test only establishes a predicative interpretation of definite and indefinite 
descriptions.  Names fail the test: 
 
24.  *He is smart and John. 
 
Although surprising, there is evidence from other sources supporting the conclusion that 
names require a denotation of type <et>.  Specifically, they may be predicated of a 
subject like adjectives, indefinite descriptions and definite descriptions: 
 
25.  He is smart/an expert on unicorns/the expert on unicorns/John. 
                                                 
18 Please see Link (1983) or Landman (1989) for further discussion of Link’s theory. 
19 This is not, in fact, the test that Partee (1986) uses to establish the necessity of a <et> type denotation for 
definites and indefinites.  She instead focuses on their compatibility with the verb considers.  This test, 
however, has not gained as wide currency in subsequent literature as the conjunction test and the 
predicative sentence test, and therefore, will not be discussed.  
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In contrast, DPs headed by determiners such as every or more than one are not usually 
acceptable in this position: 
  
26.  *They are every/more than one man. 
 
The exception to this observation is a DP in which the noun denotes a property of 
properties, or an attribute: 
 
27.  This house has been every colour.
20 
 
Partee argues that the exceptional nature of these DPs is due to the presence of the noun, 
which makes the complete DP particularly amenable to a predicative interpretation.   
Thus, on the basis of the evidence provided by these two tests, we can conclude that some 
DPs – in particular names, indefinite descriptions and definite descriptions – have a 
denotation of type <et>.   
  Although some questions can be raised about the efficacy of the conjunction test, 
it nevertheless provides the best argument for assigning a denotation of the highest type, 
<<et>,t>, to certain DPs.  If we take the failure of DPs headed by determiners such as 
every and more than one in the two previous tests as evidence of their incompatibility 
with a denotation other than <<et>,t>, then the only explanation of the ability of names, 
definite descriptions and indefinite descriptions to conjoin with these DPs is that  they 
also have a denotation of type <<et>,t>: 
 
28.  ChiSook/a woman/the woman and every man finished the exam. 
                                                 
20 Partee, 1986; 120  
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Thus, it appears that a denotation of type <<et>,t> must be added to the family of 
denotations that may be assigned to names, definite descriptions and indefinite 
descriptions. 
  As this combination of linguistic evidence and theoretical considerations 
demonstrates, there are persuasive reasons to reject Montague’s original thesis in favour 
of an approach that permits the assignment of multiple denotations to an expression.  In 
particular, there is very good evidence of the need to assign denotations of type <e>, 
<et>, and <<et>,t> to names, definite descriptions and indefinite descriptions.   
  From a theoretical standpoint, multiple denotations are not welcome news.  They 
have the potential to generate a dizzying array of interpretations for any given sentence, 
undercutting the simplicity and elegance of any semantic theory.  To forestall this 
possibility, Partee suggests the following three interpretation principles: 
 
  
i.  each basic expression is lexically assigned the simplest type adequate to 
capture its meaning. 
 
ii.  there are general type-lifting rules that provide additional higher-type 
meanings for expressions 
 
iii.  there is a general processing strategy of trying the lowest types first, using 
higher types only when they are required in order to combine meanings by 
available composition rules.
21 
 
 
Proper names provide the most straightforward illustration of this theory.  They have 
three possible denotations: <e>, <et>, and <<et>,t>.  The simplest denotation, <e>, is 
assumed to be its lexical meaning.  Type-lifting rules are employed as needed to relate 
the higher type meanings of <et> and <<et>,t> to the base type. 
  The question of how to relate the three meanings of definite descriptions proves to 
                                                 
21 Partee, 1986; 117  
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be substantially more difficult.
22  The problem is that there is no clear division of labour 
between the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the meaning of these expressions.  The 
existence and uniqueness requirement of definite descriptions may be either part of the 
semantic meaning of these expressions, and hence entailed, or not, and thus presupposed.  
This problem is of central importance to the project at hand.  In what follows, I show that 
Partee’s own solution, mixing denotations between those that entail existence and 
uniqueness and those that presuppose existence and uniqueness, is incorrect.  It fails to 
meet the challenge of subsequent work that has questioned the desirability of entailing 
uniqueness.  A better analysis is one in which existence and uniqueness are presupposed 
for all standard examples of definites.  Exceptions to this analysis exist, however.   
Specifically, superlatives and definites that include the term usual and its synonyms are 
impervious to the arguments that purport to show that uniqueness is presupposed and not 
entailed.  With two categories of definites carved out, I show that the exceptions of Ward 
and Birner, i.e. the latter category, lack a denotation of type <<et>,t>, and are, therefore, 
not exceptions to Keenan’s definition. 
 
1.2  Type-Shifting and Definite Descriptions 
 
  Partee begins her analysis of definites by suggesting that the base denotation type 
of a definite description may be of type <e> and offers the iota function as one possible 
interpretation of this meaning
23: 
 
29.  iota:  P → ιx[P(x)].
24 
  
                                                 
22 The question of how the denotations of indefinite descriptions relate is not directly relevant to this paper 
and hence will not be discussed. 
23 Partee, 1986; 121 
24 Partee, 1986; 123  
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The iota function is a partial function that maps a set, P in the above definition, on to its 
unique member.  If there is no unique individual that meets the description in the given 
context, the sentence in which a definite description has an <e> type denotation will lack 
a truth value.  Uniqueness and existence, therefore, are not entailed by the meaning of 
this expression; rather, they are conditions on their felicitous use, and therefore, 
presupposed. 
  A second function, THE, gives the meaning of the highest type, <<et>,t>.  It is a 
complete function that maps a set onto a generalized quantifier: 
 
 
30.  THE:  λQλP[∃x[∀y[Q(y) ↔ y = x] & P(x)]].
25 
 
The <et> denotation is achieved by applying the function BE to a definite description of 
type <<et>,t>: 
 
31.  BE:  λ℘λx[℘(λy[y = x])].
26 
 
BE is also a complete function. It takes all of the singletons within the denotation of a 
generalized quantifier and collects them into a set.  As THE and BE are complete 
functions, uniqueness and existence are entailed by the meaning of these expressions.  If 
there is no unique individual that satisfies the description, both THE and BE yield the 
empty set.
27  When a definite description denotes the empty set, the sentence in which it 
appears is false.
28 
  Why Partee chooses these particular functions is not immediately obvious.  She 
mentions the need for a non-presuppositional meaning of definite descriptions, but offers 
                                                 
25 Partee, 1986; 116 
26 Partee, 1986; 124 
27 Partee, 1986; 125 
28 Unless of course, the sentence is negated.  In this case, the truth value assigned to the sentence is true.  
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little justification for this belief.  She also fails to provide a strong rationale for this 
particular mix of functions.  It is, consequently, possible to raise serious doubts about her 
choice of functions.  Specifically, her decision to interpret the <et> and <<et>,t> type 
meanings as full functions fails to take into consideration the highly contentious nature of 
the uniqueness entailment.
29 
  As many authors have pointed out, not all felicitous uses of definite descriptions 
appear to require a denotation that is unique.  Suppose that the following sentence is 
uttered in a room with more than one table: 
 
32.  Naming and Necessity is on the table. 
 
Strictly speaking, the denotation of the definite description is not unique within the 
situation described above, and yet, the sentence is not necessarily false as predicted by an 
analysis in which uniqueness is entailed. The most straightforward response to this 
problem is to claim that the above expression is an incomplete definite description.  It 
must be either supplemented by hidden lexical material that fills out the description or by 
a domain restriction that delimits the denotation to a single individual.  Although these 
responses may work in standard cases, they are inadequate in a situation that contains two 
indiscernible individuals that satisfy the description.
30  If the individuals are truly 
indiscernible, then it will be impossible to provide lexical material or a domain restriction 
that uniquely identifies an individual.  The consequences of this failure should be a 
sentence that is false, and yet it is easy to construct examples in which this is not the case.  
At its most serious, the sentences will not be merely false but contradictory as in (33): 
 
                                                 
29 As it is only necessary to show that one of these properties is not entailed, I will ignore the question of 
whether existence is an entailment or a presupposition throughout this discussion. 
30 Szabo, 2005; 1197  
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33.  There is an elementary particle in a large container.  The particle is absolutely 
indiscernible from another particle in the same container.
31 
 
 
Uniqueness, therefore, cannot be an entailment of definite descriptions. 
  In order to accommodate the problem of incomplete definite descriptions, a few 
changes to Partee’s analysis are required.  The partial function iota is still a perfectly 
acceptable base meaning for definite descriptions.  It is, however, necessary to change the 
highest type of definite description from THE to a partial function.  Partee suggests 
replacing it with a composite of iota and a second function lift.  Lift is a total function that 
maps an individual onto its principal ultrafilter
32: 
 
34.  lift: j → λP[P(x)].
33 
 
BE applied to this new composite function will yield a partial function that could be used 
to represent the meaning of the <et> denotation.  As Partee points out, this alternative is 
fully commutative and leads to an interpretation of definite descriptions that is fully 
presuppositional.
34         
  And what are we to make of Partee’s original claim that there are definite 
descriptions that entail uniqueness and existence?  It need not fully drop by the wayside.  
There are at least two categories of definite descriptions that are immune to the 
conclusion of the incomplete definite description argument, and hence compatible with 
an analysis in which uniqueness is entailed.  The first is the superlative; the content of a 
                                                 
31 Szabo, 2003; 280, italics added 
32 This also imposes a change in meaning for definite descriptions of type <<et>,t> to that of Barwise and 
Cooper (1981). 
33 Partee, 1986; 121 
34 Partee, 1986; 125  
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superlative is only compatible with a unique denotation
35, as in (35): 
 
 
 
35.  There was the tallest boy in my history class at the party last night. 
 
 
The use of a superlative in a situation in which more than one individual answers to the 
description is unacceptable.  It is always possible at least in principle to complete the 
description of a superlative in order to yield an expression that denotes a unique 
individual.  Superlatives are, thus, plausible candidates to be analysed as a definite 
description that entails uniqueness. 
  The second category of expression that is immune to this problem is what Ward 
and Birner refer to as hearer-new tokens of hearer-old types.  These descriptions contain 
the term usual or its synonyms: 
 
36.  There was the usual crowd at the beach today. 
 
According to Ward and Birner, the denotation of these definite descriptions is both the 
type itself and the token that instantiates the type. The dual reference is necessary to 
explain discourses in which the anaphoric reference of subsequent pronouns is divided 
between types and tokens: 
 
 
 
37.  There was the usual crowd at the beach today.  They were there yesterday 
too.  Today for the first time they sat around a fire and roasted marshmallows.
36 
 
 
Sitting around the fire and roasting marshmallows are properties of the token that 
                                                 
35 This is not meant to imply that some superlatives do not require completion.  Rather, it implies that any 
completion must result in a unique denotation. 
36 Ward and Birner, 1995; 733   
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instantiates the type, while being there yesterday is a property of the type.  Thus, the 
definite description the usual crowd must refer simultaneously to both its type and its 
token.  Because each type is assumed to be known to the hearer, Ward and Birner 
conclude that these expressions, much like superlatives, refer to an individual that is 
uniquely identifiable. 
  Although Ward and Birner have identified an important property of this category 
of definite descriptions, viz. that they are uniquely identifiable, the type/token distinction 
will not work as an explanation.  First, there is the matter of the dual reference.  Ward 
and Birner appear to be implying that these expressions refer simultaneously to two 
individuals: a type and a token.   The actual meaning of an expression that refers to two 
different individuals simultaneously would actually mean is far from clear.  Second, if 
definite descriptions with usual or its synonyms denote a type, it is a very unusual type.  
What constitutes an instantiation of the type the usual crowd will depend a great deal on 
the context of utterance.  Suppose that there are two usual crowds at the local beach: the 
early morning sunrise lovers and the all-night partiers.  Now, suppose further that one 
night the partiers last well into the early morning, scaring away the early morning sunrise 
lovers.  Even though there is a usual crowd at the beach, I cannot use (38) to describe the 
above situation during the same morning: 
 
38.  There was the usual crowd at the beach today. 
 
Although there is a suitable dual reference available for the definite description, i.e. the 
type and the late night token, this sentence is false.  Ward and Birner’s theory cannot 
easily explain why this is so, casting further doubt on the utility of the type/token 
distinction as an explanation of the acceptability of this class of definites in ETS. 
  Instead of relying on a type/token distinction, I believe it is better to focus on two 
distinct aspects of the meaning of these expressions.  First, the addition of the adjective  
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usual or its synonyms to a definite description has the effect of raising the denotation to a 
standard against which other objects, events or individuals can be measured.  It is a point 
of reference, and as such, its denotation must be unique.  Second, the meaning of the 
adjective usual or its synonyms is extremely context-sensitive.  What constitutes usual 
for a given object, event or individual varies a great deal.  So, for example, the properties 
that are necessary for a crowd to be usual are very different than those that are necessary 
for a way home to be usual.  The best explanation of this observation is one in which we 
suppose that some aspect of the meaning of this adjective is contextually determined.  In 
other words, context determines some or all of the semantic content of usual.  Thus, the 
standard by which an object, event or individual is usual will vary from context to 
context.  Combined with the first claim that an expression that includes the term usual 
denotes something that is a standard and hence unique, we can conclude that these 
definite descriptions denote exactly one individual – whether singular or plural – in each 
context.
37  With this analysis, the mystery of (38) is easily solved.  Although the definite 
description in (38) can be used to refer to either the late night partiers or the early 
morning sunset lovers, it will only do so successfully in the right context.  In the wrong 
context, i.e. a context in which there is either no or more than one possible referent, the 
definite description will denote the empty set and the sentence will be false – as (38) 
illustrates. 
  The above observations suggest that a separate analysis of superlatives and 
definites that contain usual or its synonyms is necessary.  Unlike their standard 
counterparts, they appear to entail, not presuppose, uniqueness.  The fact that uniqueness 
is entailed and not presupposed makes the classification of these expressions as 
individual-denoting terms particularly attractive.  Like proper names, they are obvious 
                                                 
37 This claim depends on a compositional analysis of definite descriptions in which the contextually 
determined aspects of meaning are not excluded.  Please see Szabo (2001) for further discussion of how 
such an analysis can be implemented.  
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candidates for an interpretation in which they refer directly to an individual.  This claim 
is borne out by the data.  Both superlatives and definite descriptions are perfectly 
acceptable as the antecedent of a singular discourse anaphor:   
 
 
 
39.  The tallest boy in my history class finished the race first.  He looked tired. 
40.  The usual woman was at the beach today.  She didn’t bother me, though. 
 
 
There is consequently both strong theoretical and empirical evidence to not only suppose 
that these two categories of definite descriptions have an <e> type denotation, but that 
this denotation is its base type. 
  The evidence for assigning denotations of a higher type to these expressions is 
murkier.  The tests for a denotation of type <et> deliver mixed results.  Superlatives 
appear to support this denotation easily, while the evidence for assigning this denotation 
to definite descriptions that contain the term usual or its synonyms is less convincing: 
 
  
  41.  He is the tallest boy in my history class. 
  42.  He is clever and the tallest boy in my history class. 
 
  43.  That is the usual way home. 
  44.  ?This route is fast and the usual way home. 
 
  45. ?They are the usual students. 
46. ??They are clever and the usual students.   
 
 
These results suggest that there are constraints on a definite description containing usual 
receiving a predicative interpretation, but that it is a possible denotation for both of these 
categories of expressions. 
  The most interesting results are from the test for a denotation of type <<et>,t>.  
Conjoining either of these expressions to a DP of type <<et>,t> is substantially harder 
than it is in the standard cases.  In each of the following pairs of examples, the first  
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sentence is somewhat awkward – even jarring in certain instances.  The addition of 
further lexical material to the DP whose base denotation is of type <<et>,t>, however, 
greatly enhances the naturalness, and hence acceptability of the original sentence: 
 
 
 
47.  ?ChiSook likes the tallest boy in my history class and many teachers. 
48.  ChiSook likes the tallest boy in my history class and many teachers at my 
school. 
 
  49.  ?ChiSook is building the tallest tower in Ithaca and every bridge. 
  50.  ChiSook is building the tallest tower in Ithaca and every bridge in Utica. 
 
51.  ??ChiSook likes the usual students and many teachers. 
52.  ?ChiSook likes the usual students and many teachers at my school. 
53.  ?ChiSook is writing the usual memo and every letter. 
54.  ChiSook is writing the usual memo and every letter we need to send this 
week. 
 
 
There consequently appears to be something “wrong” with the conjunction in (47), (49), 
(51) and (53).  Specifically, there seems to be something wrong with conjoining a DP 
whose base denotation is of type <<et>,t> and whose domain of quantification is not 
suitably restricted to superlatives or definites that contain the term usual.   
An obvious candidate for the problem with these conjunctions is a type mismatch.  
(47), (49), (51) and (53) are interpretable, and yet odd – a potential outcome if the 
problem is that the types of the two conjuncts do not match.  As we saw in section one, 
the meaning of the nominal argument of a determiner can affect the range of denotations 
available to a DP whose base denotation is of type <<et>,t>. Thus, one explanation of 
how the addition of a modifier to the nominal argument of the determiner “fixes” the 
problem with these conjunctions is that it makes available a wider range of denotations 
for the complete DP.  The addition of lexical material in (48), (50), (52), and (54) may 
permit what is otherwise an unacceptable denotation for the second DP, i.e. type <et>.  
This would resolve the type mismatch between the first DP and the second DP in the  
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majority of cases, thereby improving the acceptability of these sentences.  Although I 
don’t have an explanation of why this is the case, one particularly nice benefit of this 
approach is that it would explain why there is some variation in the acceptability of the 
“corrected” sentences in which the first DP is a definite that contains the term usual.  Not 
all definites containing usual are compatible with a predicative interpretation, and hence 
this “fix” of the type mismatch between the two DPs will not always succeed.  
  In sum, the evidence does not appear to support assigning the same range of 
denotations to superlatives and definites that contain the term usual or its synonyms as 
their more standard counterparts.  The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence alike 
both clearly support assigning a denotation of type <e> to these expressions, but the 
evidence for adding denotations of higher types is patchy.  The two tests for a denotation 
of type <et> produced encouraging, but mixed results.  The test for a denotation of type 
<<et>,t> produced only mixed results.  As my discussion of the data demonstrates, these 
mixed results do not unambiguously support the assignment of a denotation of type 
<<et>,t> to these expressions.  Given the lack of good empirical evidence or strong 
theoretical impetus, there is no reason to suppose that superlatives and definite 
descriptions that include the term usual or its synonyms have a denotation of type 
<<et>,t>.     
  An immediate consequence of this result is that superlatives and definite 
descriptions that contain the term usual or its synonyms can no longer be counted among 
the counterexamples to Keenan’s definition.  There is consequently no reason to exclude 
them from the data to which his definition applies, which allows us to extend the 
generality of his definition in a small but important way.   
 
1.3  Conclusion 
 
  In this section, we have seen the versatility of a Partee-inspired analysis of  
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definite descriptions.  I have argued that there are in fact two interpretations of definite 
descriptions.  The first applies to the standard examples of definite descriptions and 
presupposes the existence and uniqueness of the denotation.  The second is restricted to 
two categories of definites that entail uniqueness in virtue of their content.  Unlike their 
standard counterparts, these expressions lack the full complement of denotations and are 
only compatible with an <e> type denotation and possibly a <et> type denotation.  This 
difference was claimed to be the key to understanding why these expressions do not 
contravene Keenan’s definition. 
  In the following section, I will extend this approach to include the kind terms of 
McNally and the list interpretation of Rando and Napoli.  The key difference between 
this section and the next is that the existential predicate, i.e. there is/are, is of a higher 
type, and consequently, has a slightly different meaning than the existential predicate of 
Keenan.  As a consequence, this new interpretation of the existential predicate is no 
longer compatible with DPs of type <<et>,t>.  Both kind terms and the list interpretation 
adhere to this restriction and hence are acceptable in these sentences.  Although the 
meaning of these ETS is not identical to the ETS of Keenan, this does not mean they 
should be excluded from the range of data to which his definition applies.  As I will 
show, they pose no bigger challenge to it than the exceptions of Ward and Birner. 
 
2.  Kind Terms and the List Interpretation 
 
McNally (1998) observes that the distribution of DPs that contain the term kind or 
its synonyms is completely unrestricted in ETS.
38  She also thinks that the best 
explanation of this observation is the difference in type between kind terms and other 
expressions headed by determiners.  She argues that kind terms must denote an 
                                                 
38 As Sally McConnell-Ginet has pointed out to me (p.c.), this is not perfectly true as these expressions 
appear to require a coda.  
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expression that quantifies over properties.  The most basic definition of a property is that 
which denotes a set of individuals, namely the individuals to whom the property 
applies.
39  Properties are distinct from individuals and within type theory, receive a 
different designation.  They are of type <et>, while individual denoting expressions are of 
type <e>.  The sortal restriction on the denotation of the DP is motivated by the semantic 
type of the expression there is/are.  It is a property of properties with the approximate 
meaning is instantiated.
40  Only properties or quantifiers over properties can combine 
with this expression to yield a well-formed sentence; all other expressions lead to a type 
mismatch and are therefore, unacceptable in ETS. 
  This analysis can be extended to the standard examples of ETS through the use of 
the type-shifting rules of Partee.  Specifically, we can turn to the BE function, which 
takes a DP of type <<et>,t> and maps it onto a DP of type <et>.  This function, however, 
does not give a communicatively useful value for all DPs.  If the denotation of the initial 
DP input does not contain a singleton set, the output of the BE function will be the empty 
set – something that McNally considers to be pragmatically odd and of no 
communicative interest.
41  Most weak determiners discussed at the outset of this paper 
meet this restriction easily.
42  Of the strong determiners discussed in this paper, most is 
the only one heading a DP whose denotation lacks a singleton set, and hence is 
incompatible with the BE function.  Surprisingly, neither definites nor universals are 
immediately ruled out.  In the case of definites, it is necessary for McNally to supplement 
her theory with the pragmatic condition of Ward and Birner in order to rule out standard 
                                                 
39 McNally is well aware of the problems of adopting a purely extensional definition of a property and 
includes a footnote that indicates that her theory is compatible with an intensional definition. 
40 McNally offers the following truth conditions for ETS: There be DP is true with respect to a Model M 
and variable assignment g iff [[DP]]
M,g ∈ [[There be]]
M,g.  A DP is argued to be within the extension of the 
existential predicate when it is non-empty (McNally, 1998: 375-76). 
41 McNally, 1998; 370 
42 Of the examples listed at the outset of this paper, some and two are examples of determiners that head 
phrases that are acceptable inputs for the BE function.  Many is assumed to receive a cardinal interpretation 
and as such also meets the requirements of the BE function.  DPs headed by few and no are problematic and 
will be discussed momentarily.  
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definites.  Universals, like definites, also meet the requirements of the BE function, but 
only in the case where the generator set contains a single individual.  McNally argues that 
although it is possible to use a universal under these circumstances, it is much like a 
property that denotes nothing, i.e. extremely pragmatically odd, and thus a use that is 
disfavoured by speakers. 
  Although McNally’s explanation of the distribution of DPs in the post-copular 
position in ETS is complete, it has two major drawbacks, both of which center on her 
attempt to extend her analysis to non-kind terms.  First, counterexamples exist to her 
claim that the empty set is an unacceptable output for the BE function.  DPs headed by 
weak determiners such as no and few are compatible with an interpretation in which they 
denote the empty set, and yet they are not banned from ETS.  Though semantically well-
formed, McNally’s theory predicts that (55) and (56) should be ruled out on pragmatic 
grounds, which is clearly not the case: 
 
 
55.  There are no children in the garden. 
56.  There are few children in the garden. 
 
 
The solution she pursues is to decompose each of these terms into two separate semantic 
units at logical form is admittedly less than perfect.  In the case of no, she argues that it 
should be decomposed into a clausal negation and the indefinite a, giving the following 
interpretation for (55), while (56) is decomposed into a clausal negation and the 
determiner many:  
 
 
 
57.  It is not the case that there is a child in the garden. 
58.  It is not the case that there are many children in the garden. 
 
 
Because DPs headed by a and many are both acceptable functions for the BE function, no  
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and few are not banned from ETS.  This solution is rather ad hoc, especially given the 
fact that there is very little evidence for her claim that the empty set is an unacceptable 
output for the BE function.  After all, properties that apply to no one and nothing are not 
that uncommon in language. 
Second, it is unclear why some of the DPs that are acceptable inputs of the BE 
function fail the tests for a denotation of type <et>.   DPs headed by many are 
unacceptable in the predicative position of a sentence such as (59): 
 
59.  *Those students are many troublemakers. 
 
This DP fares no better in the conjunction test for a denotation of type <et>: 
 
60.  *Those students are smart and many troublemakers. 
 
If this expression may denote an expression of type <et> as McNally contends, these 
results are unexpected and, more importantly, unexplained. 
  As a result, there are serious issues with McNally’s attempt to extend her analysis 
of kind terms to the core examples of ETS.  Therefore, I will reject her analysis as it 
applies to these expressions, but not the complete analysis.  It appears that the existential 
predicate is ambiguous in meaning.  Under one interpretation, this predicate denotes a 
property of individuals, while under the other, it denotes a property of properties.  The 
first has the truth conditions ascribed by Keenan; the second has the truth conditions 
ascribed by McNally.  As expressions with separate but related truth conditions, it is 
plausible to conclude that there are two separate but related types of ETS.  Keenan’s 
suggestion that kind terms are somewhat different is thus correct, but this fact does not 
require us to exclude kind terms from the purview of Keenan’s definition.  As kind terms 
lack the necessary denotation, they never run the risk of contravening Keenan’s  
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definition, and hence do not pose any challenge to it.  In this way, the need to draw an 
artificial distinction between the two types of sentences is averted – a fact that only 
strengthens the scope and reach of Keenan’s definition. 
  Let us now turn to the final category of exception: the list interpretation. 
 
2.1 The List Interpretation 
 
  Little has been written about the semantics of the list interpretation.  As noted by 
Rando and Napoli (1978), its taxonomy appears to fall into two broad categories.  The 
first is the incomplete list, which is demarcated by a rising intonation pattern: 
 
 
 
61.  Q: How could we get there? 
             A: Well, there’s the trolley…
43 
 
 
The second is the complete list, with a falling intonation pattern: 
 
 
 
62.  Q: Who attended your talk? 
A: Well, there was a trustee, a provost and surprisingly, every student from 
my morning section. 
 
 
As the data from Ward and Birner attests, this latter category also appears to include lists 
that contain only one member: 
 
 
 
63.  And there’s two components in [Division H], which is he operations division: 
the people that do the flight activity planning procedures work, provide for the 
crew activity planning and the time line support and integrated procedures 
development and overall flight data file management; and then there is the 
                                                 
43 Rando and Napoli, 1978; 300  
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payload support folks,
44  
 
 
This observation makes the identification of the list interpretation more complex than it 
first appears. For example, another category from Ward and Birner’s list of exceptions 
displays the distinctive intonation pattern of the complete list: hearer-old entities treated 
as hearer-new: 
 
 
64.  Mr. Rummel: Well, didn’t the designer of the orbiter, the manufacture, 
develop maintenance requirements and documentation as part of the design 
obligation. 
 
Mr. Collins:  Yes, sir.  And that is what we showed in the first part, before the Pan 
Am study.  There were those other orbiter maintenance and requirement 
specifications. 
 
65.  Like voters everywhere, Montanans are in a resentful mood, and Marlenee is 
adept at exploiting that resentment…To add to his troubles, Williams used to be 
the chairman of the subcommittee overseeing grants to the National Endowment 
of the Arts, and he firmly defended the agency against charges that it funded 
‘obscene’ art works… 
      That is what won him the support of Keillor, who said, ‘It’s a measure of the 
man when he’s courageous when it’s not absolutely required of him. 
      But  it  has  inspired  the  opposition of national conservatives, including Pat 
Robertson, who referred to Williams as ‘Pornography Pat’. 
      Then there is that resentment.
45   
 
 
This category is also sometimes referred to as reminder contexts as its most prevalent use 
is to remind a hearer of a momentarily forgotten entity.  If we set aside the context of 
these utterances, they are indistinguishable from the list interpretation.  Note, for 
example, the remarkable similarity between (63) and (65).  Moreover, it is very easy to 
convert these examples to overt lists: 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Ward and Birner, 1995; 734 
45 Ward and Birner, 1995; 730  
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66.  Like voters everywhere, Montanans are in a resentful mood, and Marlenee is 
adept at exploiting that resentment…To add to his troubles, Williams used to be 
the chairman of the subcommittee overseeing grants to the National Endowment 
of the Arts, and he firmly defended the agency against charges that it funded 
‘obscene’ art works… 
      That is what won him the support of Keillor, who said, ‘It’s a measure of the 
man when he’s courageous when it’s not absolutely required of him. 
      But  it  has  inspired  the  opposition of national conservatives, including Pat 
Robertson, who referred to Williams as ‘Pornography Pat’. 
                  Then there is that resentment, that hate and of course, the fear. 
 
 
These two observations strongly suggest that the difference in context is not sufficient to 
distinguish these two categories of expressions.
46  Reminder contexts may simply be a 
natural context of utterance for lists as enumerating items is an obvious way to remind 
someone of something.  I will, therefore, treat ETS found within reminder contexts as 
another example of the list interpretation. 
  The consensus is that lists form a single syntactic constituent; it is the list and not 
each member of the list which is the complement of the existential predicate in an ETS.  
The most natural interpretation of this syntactic constituent is one in which it denotes a 
set of objects, making a denotation of type <et> an obvious choice. In the absence of any 
empirical evidence
47 or theoretical reasons to the contrary, I will assume the standard 
                                                 
46 The need for a distinct category for reminder contexts appears to be partially motivated in Ward and 
Birner by their desire to justify one-member lists that contain definites in terms of their pragmatic condition 
on interpretation.  However, there are some obvious reasons to reject their argument.  First, lists are not 
limited to definites, and may include other expressions headed by either strong determiners or indefinites.  
The relationship between the pragmatic constraint and these other members of the list is far from clear.  
Second, the mechanism by which Ward and Birner argue the members of lists are licensed as hearer-new 
wildly over-generates.  They argue that these definites are hearer-new because they newly instantiate a 
variable in an open proposition that is part of the background information of the conversation.  Open 
propositions are formed by removing the constituent that receives nuclear focus in the sentence and 
replacing it with a variable.  In the case of (64), they identify the open proposition as, X is a component in 
Division H (Ward and Birner, 1995; 734).  The DP the payload support folks is a possible instantiation of 
the variable X, and hence licensed in ETS.  But the question of what constitutes an acceptable open 
proposition is never addressed.  Is any part of the background information relevant?  If so, how do we 
prevent the licensing of all definites in ETS? 
47 Empirical tests offer very little insight into the denotation of lists.  In particular, it is impossible to apply 
the conjunction test as lists often include a conjoined term, making it impossible to discern whether the 
newly conjoined term is part of the original list, and hence a member of the syntactic constituent whose 
denotation is of type <et>, or separate.    
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syntactic and semantic analysis for this category of ETS.  As the post-copular subject has 
a denotation of type <et>, the existential predicate of the list interpretation must be an 
expression that denotes a property of properties – roughly, as McNally puts it, means 
being instantiated.  As a result, the list interpretation is yet another example of an ETS in 
which the predicate is of a different type the core data.  As before, this in and of itself is 
not a sufficient reason to exclude the list interpretation from the data to which Keenan’s 
definition applies.  Lists do not pose a larger challenge to Keenan’s definition than kind 
terms; the fact that the complement of the existential predicate may contain a DP headed 
by a determiner which is not conservative in relation to all of its complements is simply 
not relevant to determining whether these examples are counterexamples to his definition.  
Keenan’s definition applies to the complement of the existential predicate, and in the case 
of the list interpretation, this complement is the complete list.  As lists lack the required 
denotation, they cannot contravene his definition, and hence can be safely included 
among the examples of ETS. 
 
2.2.  Conclusion 
 
In this section I have argued that the final two categories of exceptions, the kind 
terms of McNally and the list interpretation of Rando and Napoli, are perfectly 
compatible with Keenan’s definition.  The strategy that I have pursued here, as with the 
previous section, is to demonstrate that the putative counterexamples contain a DP whose 
denotation cannot be of type <<et>,t>.  If we further assume that Keenan’s definition is 
limited to DPs of type <<et>,t>, the absence of the required denotation neutralizes the 
ability of these examples to undermine the generality of his definition.  We are thus in a 
position to conclude that Keenan’s definition is fully general and, as promised, 
coextensive with the class of weak determiners.   
  Although this is an interesting result in its own right, it is impossible to ignore the  
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central problem that this definition raises: what motivates the peculiar distribution of DPs 
of type <<et>,t> in ETS?  In particular, why are DPs that have a denotation of type 
<<et>,t> and are not conservative on all of their arguments unacceptable in ETS?  I close 
this paper with a few thoughts on this problem.  As Barwise and Cooper (1981) observed, 
unacceptable ETS are either true in most models or false in most models.  The 
qualification of “most models” is necessary because Barwise and Cooper exclude from 
their discussion all undefined interpretations of the DP.  I think that this is a mistake and 
draws attention away from what may be the real cause of the unacceptability of these 
sentences: the odd behaviour of ETS in which the DP is of type <<et>,t>, headed by a 
determiner that is not weak, and most importantly, is undefined. 
 
3.  Undefined DPs and ETS 
 
  At the outset of this paper, I identified three general classes of DPs that are 
unacceptable in ETS: universals such as every child, proportionals such as most children, 
and standard definites such as the children
48: 
 
 
  
67.  ??There is every child in the garden. 
68.  ??There are most children in the garden. 
69.  ??There is the child in the garden. 
 
 
Barwise and Cooper analyse the semantic contribution of the there is/are predicate in the 
same manner as Keenan.  Combined with a Barwise and Cooper’s semantic analysis of 
                                                 
48 It should be noted that the examples of unacceptable ETS at the outset of this paper was not exhaustive.  
The three categories that I discuss form the core set of counterexamples, but others exist.  For example, this 
discussion does not cover DPs that are headed by neither.  ETS containing a DP headed by this determiner 
are false in most models, and thus not pseudo-tautological, but quasi-contradictory. The explanation offered 
here would not cover these examples, making it an incomplete, but nevertheless intriguing starting point for 
a more complete theory.   
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every child, most children and the children
49, (67), (68) and (69) are true in every model 
in which the DP is defined.  In the case of (67) and (68), all that is required for a DP to be 
defined is that it not denote the empty set.  In the case of (69), a DP is defined if it does 
not denote the empty set and there is not more than one individual in the model that 
meets the description. 
  Barwise and Cooper suggest that it is the status of these sentences as tautologies 
that may be the cause of their unacceptability.  This suggestion, however, has been 
widely discredited.  First, tautologies are not usually unacceptable as (70) demonstrates: 
 
70.  ChiSook is ChiSook. 
 
Second, a point that is rarely mentioned, but worth highlighting, it is not actually the case 
that all of these ETS meet the semantic definition of a tautology.  The standard semantic 
                                                 
49 Barwise and Cooper define every and the as follows where E is a non-empty set and A an arbitrary 
subset: 
 
[[Every]] is the function which assigns to each A ⊆ E the family [[Every]] (A) =  
{X ⊆ E⎪ A ⊆  X}. 
 
[[The]] is a function on a set defined by [[The]] (A) = {[[every]] (A) if ⎪A⎪ = 1 / undefined 
otherwise}.  
 
       (Barwise  and  Cooper,  1981;  169) 
 
(I have slightly modified the presentation of the definition of the for the purposes of my discussion).  
Barwise and Cooper only offer an informal definition of most in their article.  Keenan and Stavi (1986) 
flesh it out a bit and offer the following Barwise and Cooper inspired definition of most, which they term 
most2: 
 
(a)  t ∈ most1 (s) iff ⎪s ∧ t⎪ >⎪s ∧ t’⎪ 
(b)  most2 (s) = most1 (s) if ⎪s⎪ > 1 
                                         every (s) otherwise 
 
       (Keenan  and  Stavi,  1986;  280) 
 
where s and t are properties, t’ is the complement of t, and (s ∧ t) is read s meet t.  For present purposes, the 
most important point to note about most2 is that when the DP it heads is undefined, it has the same meaning 
as a DP headed by every.  
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definition of a tautology does not require that a sentence be true in a few or even most 
models, but that it be true in all models. Given this fact, it is even more dubious that the 
“tautological” status of sentences such as (67), (68) or (69) could be the cause of their 
unacceptability. 
    The decision to exclude certain interpretations from their explanation is actually 
quite surprising.  If we set aside the case of a definite description that is undefined 
because more than one individual meets the description, and focus our attention solely on 
the cases where the relevant DP denotes the empty set, then (67), (68) and (69) will also 
be assigned the truth value of true.
50  To see why, let us take a closer look at the proposed 
semantic analysis for (66).  If every child in the garden denotes the empty set, then it is 
must be the case that the model associated with the interpretation of this sentence has no 
members.  If the model has no members, then the predicate there is/are also denotes the 
empty set.  According to Barwise and Cooper’s semantic analysis of a DP headed by 
every, this sentence is true because the set of sets denoted by the DP every child in the 
garden includes the empty set, i.e. the set denoted by the predicate there is/are.  Why?  
Because the empty set always takes itself as a subset.  Thus, this sentence is true. 
  This analysis can be extended to cover (68) and (69).  In each case, an analogous 
semantic analysis of these sentences is possible.  This is because the semantic analyses of 
most children and the child are identical to every child when the DP denotes the empty 
set.  Thus, (68) and (69) are also true when their post-copular subject denotes the empty 
set.   
  Sentences in which the DP is undefined do not usually result in a truth value of 
true.  If we use the judgments about sentences that contain an undefined definite 
description (see Horn 2006) as a guide, there are two standard truth value assignments for 
                                                 
50 Although this demonstrates that (67) and (68) meet the semantic definition of a tautology, it still leaves 
the problem of (69), which in virtue of the need to exclude interpretations in which there is more than one 
individual, does not.  Thus, although Barwise and Cooper’s explanation of why certain ETS are 
unacceptable may still apply to two of these examples, it is not general enough to apply to all of the 
examples.  
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sentences such as (71), (72) and (73) when the DP denotes the empty set: 
 
 
71.  Every child in the garden exists. 
72.  Most children in the garden exist. 
73.  The child in the garden exists. 
 
 
The first possibility is to assign a sentence such as (71) the truth value false. Since there 
are no children in the garden, it cannot be the case that every child in the garden exists.  
The other possibility is that the truth value of this sentence is indeterminate.  When the 
denotation of a DP such as every child is the empty set, the sentence is neither true nor 
false.  It lacks a truth value, and therefore is indeterminate. Similar arguments can be 
presented for both (72) and (73).  Thus, the truth values standardly assigned to these 
sentences when the DP in the subject position denotes the empty set are either false or 
indeterminate, depending on the theory.   
  Thus it may not be the tautological status of sentences such as (66) and (67) or the 
almost tautological status of a sentence such as (69) that is the root of their 
unacceptability, but the fact that they are true when the DP denotes the empty set.  This 
truth value assignment appears to be at odds with the usual assignment of truth values to 
other sentences with a similarly undefined DP.  I think there are two promising 
explanations of why this may be a problem.  The first, and less theoretical, is that such an 
assignment of a truth value of true is simply in conflict with our intuitions about what 
truth values are permissible in such a situation.  Consequently, the sentences are ruled 
out.  Another (related) possibility is that the DPs in (67), (68) and (69) presuppose the 
existence of at least one individual. When these DPs are undefined, the sentence is 
subject to a presupposition failure.  If we assume that presupposition failures should 
result in sentences that are neither true nor false, then the truth assignment of true to these 
ETS is a problem. In this case, it is the conflict between what truth values are permissible  
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in the case of a presupposition failure and the actual truth value assigned that is the cause 
of the unacceptability of these sentences. 
  I will not attempt to defend one explanation over the other as the central point is 
not which of these possibilities is correct, but the observation that ETS that contain DPs 
that have a denotation of type <<et>,t>, are headed by a determiner that is not weak and 
denote the empty set do not receive the same assignment of truth values as other, closely 
analogous sentences.  The peculiar status of these sentences suggests that the problem 
with unacceptable ETS such as (67), (68) and (69) is not the original focus of Barwise 
and Cooper’s explanation – unacceptable ETS in which the DP is defined – but perhaps 
unacceptable ETS in which the DP is undefined.   
To truly make the case, a closer look at both the behaviour of undefined DP in 
ETS and in other constructions would be necessary.  But even as this short discussion 
hopefully illustrates, patterns such as this will only emerge with a fully general definition 
of the class of weak determiners.  With a fully general definition, it is possible to provide 
a simple semantic analysis of the core data, which in turn, can be used to highlight 
aberrations in the properties of unacceptable ETS.  Without a fully general definition, the 
relationship between the core, exceptional and unacceptable examples of ETS is likely to 
remain obscure as too will any explanation of what motivates the peculiar distribution of 
data that characterizes ETS.   
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Chapter Three: 
But, Only and Grice’s Maxims of Conversation 
 
 
0.  Introduction 
 
  Von Fintel (1993) notes the following distribution of phrase-initial DPs in but-
phrases: 
 
 
1.  Every student but ChiSook smokes. 
2.  No student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
3.  *Some student but ChiSook smokes. 
4.  *Many students but ChiSook and John smoke.
1 
 
5.  *Most students but ChiSook and John smoke. 
6.  *Few students but ChiSook and John smoke. 
 
 
As 1-6 demonstrate, the phrase-initial DP must be headed by a determiner that is a 
universal.  A second restriction applies to the complement of but.  This DP must denote a 
proper name, indefinite description, a definite description and in certain cases, a DP 
headed by a cardinal
2: 
 
                                                 
1 A second proper name is added to these examples to preclude the possibility of an agreement clash.  See 
below for more details. 
2 The best examples of cardinals are those in which the noun has been dropped.  The reasons for this are 
unclear, and to my knowledge, are not discussed anywhere in the literature.  One possibility is that this fact 
is related to the more general interpretation condition that prohibits the repetition of the same nominal 
argument in the but-phrase.  Note that both examples improve with the addition of a modifier that 
differentiates the first nominal argument from the second: 
 
  7.  ??Every student but a student 
  8.  ??Every student but the student 
  9.  ?Every student but a student who failed the exam 
  10.  ?Every student but the student who failed the exam 
 
Cardinals do not require an overt nominal argument, and hence can sidestep this restriction since they do 
not occur with a repeated nominal.    
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  11.  No student but ChiSook smokes. 
  12.  No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money.
3 
  13.  Every student but the blockhead smokes. 
  14.  Every student but one smokes. 
 
  15.  *No student but every blockhead smokes. 
  16.  *Every student but no blockhead smokes. 
17.  ??No students but many blockheads smoke. 
  18.  ??No students but most blockheads smoke. 
19.  ??No students but few blockheads smoke. 
 
 
In a later handout (von Fintel, 2000), von Fintel remarks that others have observed that 
the second co-occurrence restriction requirement of but-phrases closely mirrors the DPs 
that are acceptable as the complement of only in what I will term for the purposes of this 
paper only-initial sentences (see Szabolcsi cited in Moltmann, 1995).
4  Although this list 
is in an inchoate form, the similarities are striking: 
 
  20.  Only ChiSook smokes. 
  21.  Only the student smokes. 
  22.  Only two students smoke.
5 
 
  23.  ??Only every student smokes. 
  24.  ??Only many students smoke. 
  25.  ??Only most students smoke. 
  26.  ??Only few students smoke.
6 
                                                 
3 von Fintel, 1993; 126 (credited to Dr. Johnson) 
4 Although the distribution of DPs in only-initial sentences appears to mirror the distribution of DPs that are 
the direct complement of only in other positions, 
 
27.  ChiSook likes only John/the boys in her class/two boys in her class. 
28.  ??ChiSook likes only every boy in her class/most boys in her class. 
 
I will restrict my attention to examples where only is in a sentence-initial position. 
5 von Fintel includes DPs headed by at most on this list.  I find these examples interpretable, but very 
unnatural: 
 
  29.  ?All the students but at most five law students complained. 
  30.  ?Only at most five law students complained. 
        ( v o n   F i n t e l ,   2 0 0 0 ,   3   [ 3 3 ] )  
 
Because it is unclear to me whether these sentences are in fact acceptable, I will not include them among 
the  cited  data.       
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With the addition of (31), the list of acceptable DPs in only-initial sentences includes 
proper names, indefinite descriptions, definite descriptions and cardinals: 
 
31.  Only a student (in my class) smokes. 
 
Thus, the distribution of DPs in only-initial sentences and in the second position of but-
phrases appears to be very closely related. 
  As promising as this initial observation is, there are two exceptions that mar a 
perfect correlation between the distribution of DPs in these two constructions.  First, DPs 
headed by some and a few
7 are perfectly natural in only-initial sentences, but not in but-
phrases: 
 
 
32.  Only some students smoke. 
33.  Only a few students smoke. 
 
34.  ??Every student but some blockheads smoke. 
35.  ??Every student but a few blockheads smoke. 
 
 
If we assume that some and a few have an interpretation that is cardinal in nature
8, it is 
not surprising that they are acceptable in only-initial sentences.  What is surprising and 
therefore, in need of explanation is the observation that these DPs are unacceptable in 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Two points about few are worth mentioning.  First, there is some variability in the acceptability of only-
initial sentences in which the DP is headed by this determiner.  For the purposes of this paper, I will restrict 
my attention to the dialect in which it is ruled out.  Second, a distinction needs to be drawn between few 
and a few.  A few is not a simple variant of few.  It lacks a comparative form and also fails to license 
negative polarity items (Kayne, 2005; 189).  Thus, there is no reason to believe that what holds for one 
necessarily holds for the other. 
7 A few does not exhaust the list of determiners of this type that are acceptable in only-initial sentences.  
Other examples include a hundred and a dozen.  Because these expressions appear to be part of the same 
category as a few, I will treat a few as representative. 
8 See Keenan and Stavi (1986) for a discussion of the cardinal interpretation of a few and Milsark (1977) 
for a discussion of the cardinal interpretation of some.  
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but-phrases. 
  In the case of (34) and (35), the problem appears to be that there is a clash in the 
agreement requirements of the singular every student and the plural some/a few 
blockheads.
9  This problem becomes even more pronounced when the verbal complement 
of the but-phrase is in a tense in which the distinction between singular and plural is 
(phonologically) clearer: 
 
 
36.  *Every student but a few blockheads was smoking. 
37.  ??Every student but a few blockheads were smoking.  
 
 
In addition, note that (38), where the second DP is singular, is substantially more 
acceptable than (34)
10: 
 
38.  Every student but some blockhead smokes. 
 
Thus, if we assume that the difference in the distribution of plural DPs headed by some 
and a few in only-initial sentences and but-phrase is due to the unrelated problem of an 
agreement clash, this data does not prevent us from concluding there is a significant 
overlap in the distribution of DPs in these two constructions. 
  The second and more perplexing difference is that sentences such as 28-30 are 
substantially more acceptable in contexts where an explicit contrast has been made 
between the determiner in the only-initial sentence and a determiner in a related question 
or sentence: 
                                                 
9 I would like to thank Sally McConnell-Ginet for suggesting this possibility to me. 
10 There is also some variability in the acceptability of singular but-phrases headed by no.   
 
  39.  ?No student but a blockhead smokes. 
  40.  No movie but an action flick will please the students. 
 
I will not attempt to chart the conditions under which singular but-phrases headed by no are acceptable and 
treat singular but-phrases headed by every and no as a monolithic group.  
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41.  Does every student smoke? 
 
42.  No.  ?Only many students smoke. 
43.  No.  ?Only most students smoke. 
44.  No.  ?Only few students smoke. 
 
 
There is no corollary of this phenomenon in the second position of a but-phrase.  Thus, 
although the distribution of DPs in these two constructions is very similar, it is not 
identical.  The co-occurrence restriction of only-initial sentences appears to be identical 
to the second co-occurrence restriction of but-phrases except in a situation where an 
explicit contrast between two determiners is made. 
  The objective of this paper is to offer some insight into the surprisingly similar 
distribution of DPs in but-phrases and only-initial sentences.  In order to do this, I will 
offer a new explanation of the first co-occurrence restriction and discuss a highly 
promising, but still incomplete explanatory strategy for the second co-occurrence 
restriction of but-phrases.  I will then attempt to strengthen both of these points with a 
discussion of the distributional pattern, including the exceptions, of DPs in only-initial 
sentences.  Two ideas will play a central role in this paper: 1) type theory and its effects 
on the distribution of DPs and, 2) the interaction of the unacceptable sentences with 
Grice’s maxims of conversation. 
  In the first section, I present von Fintel’s (1993) analysis of but-phrases.  I leave 
his semantic analysis untouched but question the motivation he provides for both the first 
and second co-occurrence restriction requirements of this construction.  Von Fintel notes 
that his analysis predicts that sentences that contain a but-phrase that is not headed by a 
universal determiner will be false in most models.  He suggests that this quasi-
contradictory status is at the heart of the unacceptability of these sentences, perhaps via a  
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process of grammaticalization.
11  Although an intriguing observation, it is not an 
explanation since many sentences, such as contradictions, are perfectly acceptable and 
yet false in all models.  Von Fintel’s discussion of the second co-occurrence restriction is 
very limited, but does not fare much better.  The observed limitation to proper names, 
definites, indefinites and cardinals appears to be motivated by the fact that but requires an 
argument that denotes a set.  Of course, more than just these DPs may denote a set, 
leaving the explanation of the second co-occurrence restriction requirement incomplete at 
best.   
My solution is two-fold.  First, the type assignment of but is such that it is only 
compatible with arguments that may be of type <et> and type <<et>,t>.  This is not 
wholly unexpected since the intuitive meaning of but is a “set-subtractor”.  Proper names, 
definites, indefinites and cardinals are the only DPs that are compatible with both of these 
denotations, and hence the only DPs that may be the argument of but.  My observations 
about the first co-occurrence restriction on but-phrases find their roots in von Fintel’s 
observation that all but-phrases headed by non-universal determiners are quasi-
contradictory.  However, instead of focusing on those interpretations under which these 
sentences are false, we should turn our attention to those under which they are true.  
Sentences in which the subject is an ill-formed but-phrase are only true in very specific 
models: those in which there are at least two individuals and the sole exception to the 
general claim is exactly one individual.  In other words, these sentences are only true in 
models in which sentences whose subject is a but-phrase headed by a positive universal 
determiner are also true. This surprising convergence of models means that any speaker 
that attempts to use a sentence in which the subject is an ill-formed but-phrase to make a 
true utterance will consistently flout one of Grice’s maxims of conversation: Quantity.  If 
the speaker attempts to use one of these sentences to make a false utterance, she will 
                                                 
11 von Fintel, 1993; 132  
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consistently flout another of Grice’s maxims: Quality.  Thus, regardless of what she does, 
the speaker will be unable to utter one of these sentences without violating at least one of 
Grice’s maxims of conversation.   
In the third section, I will discuss a different, but as I will argue, related 
phenomenon: the distribution of DPs in only-initial sentences.  What is particularly 
interesting about this construction is the manner in which BOTH of the above 
explanations can be invoked to explain the distribution of DPs in this construction. Type 
theory will once again play a central role in my explanation of the linguistic facts that 
characterize only-initial sentences.  The observed similarity between the distribution of 
DPs in only-initial sentences and within the second position of a but-phrase is argued to 
be the result of a general ban on DPs whose base denotation is of type <<et>,t>.
12  The 
exception to this claim, i.e. only-initial sentences for which an explicit contrast is made 
between the determiners, provides further evidence of the important role that 
conversational maxims may play in determining the acceptability of certain utterances.   
It is only in a context where a specific alternative determiner has been provided for the 
interpretation that a speaker can be confident that her utterance of certain only-initial 
sentences will not flout the conversational maxim of Quality. In short, the distribution of 
DPs in certain only-initial sentences may provide more evidence that Grice’s 
conversational maxims impact the distribution of DPs in some constructions. 
  Thus, although the distribution of DPs in these two constructions is not identical, 
they nevertheless share much in common.  The distribution of DPs of type <<et>,t> in 
both of these constructions highlights not only the central role that type theory can play in 
the explanation of distributional facts such as these, but also provides evidence of the 
impact that Grice’s conversational maxims may have on the acceptability of certain 
utterances. Expanding this last point to full-fledged explanation would require both more 
                                                 
12 This terminology is taken from Partee (1986) and refers to DPs headed by determiners such as every, 
most and many.  
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evidence and as is discussed in the conclusion, a principled explanation of why consistent 
violations render an utterance unacceptable, whereas occasional violations merely render 
an utterance pragmatically odd.  Nevertheless, the distributional facts that characterize 
but and only point to some very intriguing possibilities. 
 
1.  But-phrases 
 
  Recall that there are two co-occurrence restrictions on but-phrases.  The first 
applies to the phrase-initial DP.  It must be headed by a determiner that is universal in 
force: 
 
 
45.  Every student but ChiSook smokes. 
46.  No student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
  47.  *Some student but ChiSook smokes. 
  48.  *Many students but ChiSook and John smoke. 
  49.  *Most students but ChiSook and John smoke. 
  50.  *Few students but ChiSook and John smoke. 
 
 
The second restriction applies to the complement of but.  This DP must be a proper name, 
an indefinite description, a definite description, or a cardinal: 
 
 
 
51.  No student but ChiSook smokes. 
52.  No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money. 
53.  Every student but the blockhead smokes. 
54.  Every student but one smokes. 
 
 
Von Fintel attempts to provide an analysis that accounts for both of these observations, 
but as we shall see, with only limited success. 
  According to von Fintel, a semantic analysis of but-phrases has three goals.  The  
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first is to capture the intuition that set subtraction is central to the meaning of this 
construction.  In (55), 
 
55.  Every student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
the use of the but-phrase is argued to “save” this sentence by removing ChiSook from the 
set of students that is under consideration.  Unfortunately, a semantic analysis that 
consisted of nothing but set subtraction would fail to explain the distributional facts 
discussed above.  It would also have the drawback of being unable to block unwanted 
inference patterns.  Universal determiners are left downward monotonic, a property that 
licenses inferences from the set denoted by the left argument to any of its subsets: 
 
 
 
56.  Every human being is mortal. 
       ⇒  Every male human being is mortal. 
 
 
But-phrases retain the property of left downward monotonicity, and consequently license 
the same inference pattern: 
 
 
 
57.  Every student but ChiSook smokes. 
                   ⇒  Every student but ChiSook and Julie smoke.
13 
 
 
The set of students minus ChiSook and Julie is a subset of the set of students that lacks 
ChiSook alone, and hence the inference is predicted to be acceptable, which in this case 
is wrong.  Consequently, the second goal of any semantic analysis of but-phrases is to 
rule this inference out.  Finally, sentences that contain but-phrases are thought to entail 
                                                 
13 I ignore the agreement problem here in order to allow von Fintel to make his point.  
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three sentences.
14  In the case of (55), those sentences are: 
 
 
i.    ChiSook is a student 
ii.   Every student other than ChiSook smokes. 
iii.  ChiSook doesn’t smoke. 
 
 
Thus the third goal of an analysis of but-phrases is to generate the correct entailments.  
  The core of von Fintel’s analysis is set subtraction, which is further augmented by 
a Uniqueness Condition that guarantees first and foremost that the unwanted entailments 
of the universal determiners are blocked: 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 von Fintel is somewhat ambivalent about the status of (i), (ii) and (iii) as entailments.  In the case of (ii) 
and (iii), his classification appears to be the result of a process of elimination. (ii) and (iii) are either 
conventional implicatures or entailments.  He applies Karttunen and Peters’ (1979) test to disambiguate 
entailments from conventional implicatures and demonstrates that it yields very encouraging results for the 
classification of these two sentences as entailments.  If a sentence such as every student but ChiSook 
smokes is embedded under a verb such as notice, 
 
58.  John just noticed that every student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
it is possible to claim that not only has John noticed that every student other than ChiSook smokes, but that 
she doesn’t smoke either.  Nevertheless, he observes in a footnote that there may be “weak” dialects of 
English for which neither (ii) nor (iii) is entailed.  My discussion is limited to dialects in which (ii) and (iii) 
are entailed.   
     The status of (i) is more difficult to adjudicate.  Although von Fintel does not discuss his decision to 
classify (i) as an entailment in detail, an application of the tests for the classification of this sentence as an 
entailment or a conventional implicature yields very murky results.  For example, (i) fails Karttunen and 
Peter’s test.  In the case of (58) it cannot be claimed that John just noticed that ChiSook is a student.  This 
suggests that it may be a conventional implicature.  If it is a conventional implicature, it should be difficult 
to cancel.  An application of a cancellation test yields less than clear results.   
 
59.  ?Every student but ChiSook smokes.  Although I don’t know if ChiSook is a student. 
 
The acceptability of this fragment of discourse is debatable.  I do not have very clear intuitions about 
whether the speaker has in fact cancelled anything, and thus do not find it a particularly decisive piece of 
evidence for the classification of (i) as a conventional implicature.  I suspect that the lack of clear evidence 
one way or the other may be why von Fintel decides to classify (i) as an entailment for the sake of 
“simplicity” (von Fintel, 1993; 125).  Given the lack of an obvious alternative, I will follow him in this 
classification.  
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D A [[but]] C P = True 
            ⇔  P ∈ D(A – C)   &   ∀S (P ∈ D(A – S) ⇒ C ⊆ S).
15 
                   ⇑                                        ⇑ 
   Domain Subtraction         Uniqueness Condition 
 
  D is the determiner, A the first argument, C the exception and P the second argument of 
the determiner.
16  In the case of (55), the set denoted by C in the second sentence is not 
the unique, smallest exception.  This designation belongs to the set denoted by C in the 
first sentence of the inference pattern.  Thus, the second sentence cannot be inferred from 
the first sentence.   
It also can be shown that this semantic analysis entails claims (i) – (iii) in the case 
of a sentence like (55).  This is because the first clause of this analysis, Domain 
Subtraction, assures that the set denoted by C contains all the exceptions, while the 
second clause, Uniqueness Condition, assures that these are the only exceptions.  This 
combination precludes the possibility of there being any other student than ChiSook who 
doesn’t smoke, thus entailing that ChiSook is a student, every student other than ChiSook 
smokes, and that ChiSook doesn’t smoke. 
  One of the particularly interesting aspects of this analysis is the prediction that 
sentences that contain a left upward monotone but-phrase, such as those headed by some 
or many, will rarely meet the Uniqueness Condition, and consequently, will be, in most 
cases, false.  Left upward monotone determiners license inferences from sets to supersets: 
 
 
60.  Some female human being is an athlete. 
       ⇒  Some human being is an athlete. 
 
 
                                                 
15 von Fintel, 1993; 130 
16 von Fintel assumes that C either denotes a set or is type-lifted to an entity of type <et> through the 
application of a type-lifting function.  
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So left upward monotone determiners license the replacement of any set denoted by C 
with any superset containing C.  In the case of but-phrases, if P ∈ D(A – C), then it is 
also the case that P ∈ D(A), which means that C does not denote the unique exception to 
the original claim containing the but-phrase.  To illustrate, let us suppose that (61) is 
uttered in a situation where there are three individuals who smoke, and two who do not, 
ChiSook and Alex. 
 
61.  ??Some student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
In this situation, the set containing ChiSook is not the unique exception to those that 
smoke.  There are alternative sets that C could denote, such as the set consisting of 
ChiSook and Alex.  Consequently, the Uniqueness Condition would not be satisfied.  The 
sole situation in which the Uniqueness Condition could be satisfied is one in which there 
is exactly one student that does not smoke.
17  In this situation, there is no superset that 
contains C, and hence, no possibility that an alternative exception set exists.   
  A similar observation can be made about examples (49) and (50).  In the majority 
of cases, they will also fail to meet the Uniqueness Condition because of the lack of a 
unique exception set.  Take, for example, a DP headed by a determiner that is not upward 
left monotone such as most.  Suppose that (62), 
 
62.  ??Most students but ChiSook and John smoke. 
 
is uttered in a situation where there are three non-smokers, ChiSook, John and Kenneth, 
and four smokers. In this situation, ChiSook and John are not members of the set that is 
the unique exception to the set of students who smoke.  The set containing ChiSook and 
                                                 
17 von Fintel does not note this case as he seems to think that the general inability of these sentences to 
block the unwanted inference pattern is sufficient to rule them out.  
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Kenneth is a viable alternative.  As before, there is a situation in which this is not the 
case: one in which there is exactly one individual who is the exception.
18  Thus, like the 
previous case, a sentence containing a but-phrase in which the initial DP is headed by 
most is almost always false. 
  In light of these observations, von Fintel suggests that the first co-occurrence 
restriction may be the result of a prohibition on sentences that are (usually) false.   
Although this observation is provocative, it is not an explanation.  Contradictions are not 
ungrammatical in English.  Consequently, there is no particular reason to believe that the 
quasi-contradictory status of the above examples is the cause of their unacceptability.  A 
much better explanation of the first co-occurrence restriction of but-phrases is needed. 
  Von Fintel does not appear to have a fully worked-out explanation of the second 
co-occurrence requirement of but-phrases.  Presumably, because his semantic analysis 
assumes that the second DP denotes a set, an explanation of the second restriction would 
hinge on this fact.  Although it is clear that all the acceptable DPs in this position are 
compatible with this requirement, so are other DPs.  Set denotation in and of itself cannot 
be the whole story; something else is needed to explain the second co-occurrence 
restriction requirement of but-phrases. 
  The following section attempts to respond to both of these problems.  I begin with 
the second co-occurrence restriction, where I think type theory plays a central role in the 
distributional facts.  To see why this is the case, it is necessary to turn to von Fintel’s 
syntactic analysis of but-phrases. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Independently, a sentence uttered in this situation would be ungrammatical because of problems with 
agreement.  The fact that it is ungrammatical does not affect the general point that it would be well-formed 
from the point of view of von Fintel’s semantics.  
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2.1  The Second Co-Occurrence Restriction 
 
Von Fintel identifies two possible syntactic analyses of but-phrases.  The first 
syntactic analysis that von Fintel suggests is to treat the internal but-phrase
19 as an 
expression that combines with the denotation of an N’ to yield another N’: 
 
 
 
 
The resulting N’ takes a determiner as its argument and yields a DP of type <<et>,t>.
20  
The other possibility he suggests is one in which the internal but-phrase directly modifies 
the determiner.  The denotation of the determiner combines with the denotation of the 
internal but-phrase to form a discontinuous constituent that is a determiner: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The term internal but-phrase refers to the but X in von Fintel’s syntactic analysis. 
20 von Fintel actually considers the resulting phrase an NP and not a DP.  I have changed this feature of his 
analyses in order to keep the terminology in this paper consistent. 
DP<<et>,t>
Det<<et>,<<et>, t> N’<et>
Det<<et>,<<et>, t> but  X<<<et>,<<et>,t>>, <<et>,<<et>,t>>>
 
DP<<et>,t>
Det<<et>,<<et>, t> N’<<<et>,<<et>t>>, <<et>,t>>
N’<et> but X<<et>, <<<et>, <<et>,t>, <<et>,t>>> 
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The resulting determiner takes a N’ as an argument and yields a NP of type <<et>,t>.
21   
  Neither of the analyses that von Fintel suggests is particularly obvious as they 
both demand an unorthodox assignment of types to the constituents of the but-phrase.  
The reason that von Fintel eschews more standard analyses – either one in which the 
internal but-phrase combines with an N’ to yield a new expression that is the argument of 
the determiner that heads this construction OR one in which the internal but-phrase 
modifies the initial DP of this construction – is that he thinks his semantic analysis 
excludes these two options.  His analysis requires that the internal but-phrase have access 
to both the determiner, i.e. D in his formalization, and the first argument of the 
determiner, i.e. A in his formalization.  An analysis in which the internal but-phrase 
modifies the noun directly precludes access to the determiner, whereas an analysis in 
which it modifies the complete DP precludes access to both the determiner and the first 
argument.  Thus, if the semantics is to be read directly off the syntax, an unorthodox 
syntactic analysis of but-phrases will be necessary. 
  Although a laudable goal, the desideratum of reading the semantics off of the 
syntax should be abandoned in the case of but-phrases.  There are three very good 
reasons to prefer an analysis in which the internal but-phrase modifies the initial DP of 
this construction, i.e. the second standard option. Von Fintel offers the first reason in 
footnote eighteen of his paper.  He notes an observation from Hoeksema (1990) that there 
is a close semantic parallel between certain but-phrases and relative clauses with 
conjoined heads or hydras: 
 
 
 
63.  The boy and the girl who dated each other are friends of mine. 
                                                 
21 Of the two analyses, von Fintel prefers the second.  He cites two reasons.  First, discontinuous elements 
are attested in the grammar.  Second, the type assigned to the but-phrase that modifies the determiner is 
also attested to.  It has the same type as almost, a function that maps a determiner denotation onto a 
determiner denotation (von Fintel, 1993; 135).  
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64.  Every man and every woman but Adam and Eve were born in sin. 
 
The relative clause in (63) modifies the combined denotation of the two DPs, not each DP 
independently.  Semantically, the best manner in which to account for this fact is to posit 
an analysis in which the relative clause modifies a DP whose denotation is the combined 
denotation of the conjoined heads of this construction (see Link 1983).  Analogously, but 
Adam and Eve modifies the combined denotation the two initial DPs of the but-phrase in 
(64).  And as with (63), the best analysis of this construction is one in which the internal 
but-phrase modifies a DP whose denotation is the combined denotation of the phrases 
every man and every woman.  It is substantially easier to explain the acceptability of (64) 
if we assume that the standard analysis of this construction is one in which the internal 
but-phrase modifies the initial DP and not one of the options suggested by von Fintel.   
  A second advantage of adopting an analysis in which the internal but-phrase 
modifies the initial DP that heads this construction is that it facilitates a substantially 
simpler assignment of types to its constituent parts.  To implement this analysis, let us 
assume that but combines with its nominal argument to yield its own syntactic head: 
ButP.  If we further assume that the resulting expression is, as von Fintel assumes, of type 
<<et>,t>, then the following assignment of types follows naturally: 
 
 
 
 
 
DP<<et>,t>
DP<<et>,t> ButP<<<et>,t>, <<et>,t>> 
Det<<et>, <<et>,t>> N’<et> but<<<et>,t>, <<<et>,t>, <<et>,t>>> N’<<et>,t>  
  64
One immediate benefit of this analysis is that the type associated with the internal but-
phrase is one that closely reflects its intuitive meaning.  It is in some sense a “set 
subtractor” and hence, an expression that relates sets. 
  As natural as this type assignment appears, it raises an obvious question: why 
aren’t DPs that have a base denotation of type <<et>,t> licit as the argument of but?  
Recall that in examples (15), (17) and (18), DPs headed by quantifiers such as every, 
many and most are unacceptable in the second position of this construction.  In other 
words, how does the second co-occurrence restriction relate to this analysis of but-
phrases?   
  The answer to this question is that the complement of but must be compatible 
with a denotation of type <et> and <<et>,t>.  DPs that only have a denotation of type 
<<et>,t> fail to meet this criterion and consequently, are ruled out.  In contrast, proper 
names, definites, indefinites and cardinals have a substantially more flexible type 
assignment.  They are compatible with a denotation of type <e>, <et> and <<et>,t>, 
allowing them to easily meet this requirement.
22   
The reason why the complement of but must be compatible with both denotation 
types and not just one or the other is due to the manner in which types are assigned to the 
remaining constituents of this construction, specifically the type assignment of the initial 
DP and the resulting type of the complete but-phrase. 
Because our interest has been the distribution of DPs in the second position of this 
construction until this point, I have made the simplifying assumption in the presentation 
                                                 
22 Partee (1986) provides many of the best tests to establish the type assignment of an expression.  In 
particular, she argues that the ability of an expression to conjoin with another expression whose sole 
denotation is of type <<et>,t> or type <et> is evidence that the original expression shares the same 
denotation since conjunction is assumed to be only possible between expressions of the same type.  The test 
that she provides for a denotation of type <e> only applies to an expression that is singular.  On the basis of 
results from Heim (1982) and Kamp (1981), she argues that only expressions with a denotation of type <e> 
are suitable antecedents for discourse anaphors.  Combined with Link’s (1983) subsequent arguments for 
an <e> type denotation for plurals, in particular plural definite descriptions, it is plausible to assume that 
proper names, definite descriptions, indefinite descriptions and cardinals are compatible with a denotation 
of type <e>, <et> and <<et>,t>.  
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of the data that the initial DP of this construction is always a standard DP, i.e. one in 
which the determiner is separate from its nominal argument.  This is, in fact, not true.  
The initial DP may also consist of a determiner that is fused to its nominal argument or a 
fused-head DP
23: 
 
 
 
65.  Nothing but a ridiculous hoax 
66.  Everything but the kitchen sink
24 
 
 
Unlike other DPs that are quantificational in force, fused-head DPs pass the standard test 
for a denotation of type <et>.  They are perfectly acceptable in the predicative position of 
a sentence: 
 
 
 
67.  It is nothing. 
68.  It is everything that I have ever wanted.
25 
 
70.  *She is every student. 
71.  *They are most things that I have ever wanted. 
 
 
 
Thus, unlike examples of DPs where the determiner is not fused to its nominal 
                                                 
23 The term fused-head DP is inspired by Huddleston and Pullum’s term fused-head NP.  It refers to a DP 
whose “head is realized jointly with a dependent function” (Huddleston and Pullum, 2002; 369).  In this 
paper, it will refer solely to a DP in which the determiner and noun are fused.   
24 von Fintel, 1993; 126 
25 It should be noted that there is some variation in the acceptability of fused-head DPs in predicative 
position.  Although (68) is fine, removing the relative clause that I have ever wanted results in an 
unacceptable sentence: 
 
72.  ??It is everything. 
 
Although the ability to appear in the predicative position of a sentence is widely accepted as a basic test for 
a denotation of type <et>, there is no clear consensus on what mixed results suggest.  I will, therefore, 
conclude that even in the light of counterexamples, fused-head DPs are compatible with a denotation of 
type <et>.  
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argument,
26 fused-head DPs must have a denotation of type <et>.  
  The fact that the initial DP of but-phrases may have a denotation of type <et> 
forces us to rethink the types assigned to both the complete but-phrase and its remaining 
constituents.  Recall that the type assigned to a complete but-phrase headed by a DP that 
is not fused is of type <<et>,t>.  This designation is consistent with the performance of 
these expressions on the predication test: 
 
 
73.  ??Science is no theory but a ridiculous hoax. 
74.  ??This one is every music but jazz.  
 
 
But not with the performance of but-phrases headed by fused-head DPs: 
 
 
75.  Science is nothing but a ridiculous hoax. 
76. This one is everything but the kitchen sink.  Jazz, hip-hop and a lot of soul.
27 
 
Thus, a complete but-phrase in which the initial DP is fused must have a denotation of 
                                                 
26 There are exceptions to the claim DPs headed by non-fused determiners are not acceptable to in 
predicative position.  Partee (1986) offers one such example: 
 
  77.  That house has been every colour. 
 
She suggests that examples such as (77) are acceptable because of the special properties of the noun colour.  
Its inclusion results in a DP that is particularly amenable to a denotation of type <et>.  Consequently, these 
examples are assumed to be consistent with the general claim that predicative expressions have a 
denotation of type <et>.  The fact that these expressions are not acceptable as the complement of but may 
be evidence that that the second co-occurrence restriction applies to complete categories of expressions and 
not sub-categories.  Proper names, definites, indefinites and cardinals are always compatible with a 
denotation of type <et> and type <<et>,t>, while DPs headed by determiners such as every are only 
compatible with both of these denotation types if their nominal argument belongs to a specific lexical class, 
i.e. if they are a member of a sub-category of a more general category of expression.  
27 As with simple fused-head DPs, not all examples of but-phrases headed by a fused-head DP are 
acceptable in predicative position.  In particular, but-phrases headed by fused-head DPs in which the 
immediate argument of but is a proper name are very difficult to use in predicative positions: 
 
78.  *He is everyone but John 
 
Although this variability is in need of an explanation, I do not think that it demonstrates that but-phrases 
headed by fused-head DPs lack a denotation of type <et>. 
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type <et>. 
On the basis of the observation that both the complete but-phrase and the phrase-
initial DP have a denotation of type <et>, we can conclude that the type of ButP in these 
expressions must be <<et>, <et>>.  The assignment of a new type to the ButP requires 
that the type of but also be altered.  In the original analysis, it is assigned the type 
<<<et>,t>, <<<et>,t>, <<et>,t>>>.   An obvious type assignment for but when it is part 
of a but-phrase that is headed by a fused-head DP would be one in which all the types are 
lowered:  <<et>, <<et>, <et>>.   
This type assignment would require that the direct complement of but have a 
denotation of type <et> when it is headed by a fused-head DP.  This restriction on the 
type of the complement could be implemented in two ways.  One would be to restrict the 
complement of but to DPs whose denotation is of type <et> when the initial DP of the 
but-phrase is fused.  The other would be to restrict the complement of but to DPs that are 
compatible with a denotation of type <et> and type <<et>,t>, thereby bypassing the need 
for a construction specific restriction when the initial DP of a but-phrase is fused.  And 
this is indeed what appears to be the case.  The complement of but is restricted to DPs 
that are compatible with both a denotation of type <et> and type <<et>,t>.  
  In sum, with careful attention to types and by adopting a new syntactic analysis of 
but-phrases, we derive three significant benefits.  First, we are in a better position to 
explain the acceptability of hydra-like structures.  Second, the type assigned to the 
constituents of this construction are more natural and in the case of but, more closely 
reflects its core meaning as an expression that relates sets.  Finally, and most importantly 
from the point of view of this paper, it offers a straightforward explanation of the second 
co-occurrence restriction.  I will therefore reject both of von Fintel’s proposed analyses in 
favour of one in which the internal but-phrase modifies the initial DP of this construction.   
And so, the first problem about the distribution of DPs in but-phrases is solved.  
Let us now turn to the other.  
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2.2  The First Co-Occurrence Restriction 
 
  Von Fintel’s semantic analysis of but-phrases draws attention to a very interesting 
feature of sentences that contain but-phrases in which the initial DP is not headed by a 
determiner that is universal in force: they are false in most models.  Left upward 
monotone but-phrases, i.e. those in which the initial DP is headed by a determiner such as 
some or many, will fail to meet the Uniqueness Condition in most models.  The 
exceptions to this general claim are sentences interpreted against a model in which the 
nominal complement of but denotes a unique individual who is the exception.  Sentences 
that contain but-phrases whose initial DP is headed by a non-left upward monotone 
determiners such as most are equally likely to run afoul of the Uniqueness Condition in 
most models.  Again, the sole exception is one in which the nominal complement of but 
denotes the unique exception.  Thus, like the previous example, sentences that contain 
these but-phrases are generally false. 
  The explanation that von Fintel suggests for the unacceptability of these sentences 
focuses on their quasi-contradictory status.  He claims that a few “exotic” interpretations 
will not be enough to prevent a process of grammaticalization that renders these 
sentences unacceptable.  Of course, as he points out and I reiterated above, the problem 
with this strategy is that contradictions are not generally unacceptable, and so 
shoehorning these sentences into that category provides us with little explanatory value. 
  Nevertheless, I think that von Fintel’s observation about the status of these 
sentences is important to understanding why they are unacceptable. The key, however, is 
not to ignore models in which these sentences are true.  When we focus our attention on 
these models, a very interesting pattern emerges: the conditions under which a sentence 
with an ill-formed but-phrase is true are the same as those under which a sentence with a 
but-phrase headed by a positive universal determiner is true. That is, a sentence with an 
ill-formed but-phrase is only true if it has what is essentially a universal interpretation.  
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This suggests that the problem with these sentences is not semantic in nature, but 
pragmatic.  Any attempt to use these sentences to utter something true will result in a 
violation of one of Grice’s main conversational maxims: Quantity.
28  Quantity consists of 
two parts: 
 
 
Quantity 
i. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes 
of the exchange) 
 
ii. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
 29 
 
 
A speaker whose utterance contains an ill-formed but-phrase in subject position can 
always make her contribution more informative, and thus avoid a violation of the first 
part of the maxim of Quantity, viz. by replacing the subject in her utterance with a but-
phrase that is universal in force.  Arguably such a replacement does not make the 
contribution  more informative than is required, suggesting it would in fact be as 
informative as is required.  
  The other possibility is for the speaker to use a sentence with an ill-formed but-
phrase in the subject position to make a false utterance.  If she chooses this route, she will 
once again be in violation of one of Grice’s maxims of conversation: Quality: 
 
 
Quality 
(Supermaxim) Try to make your contribution one that is true.
30 
 
 
Thus, any attempt to utter a sentence with an ill-formed but-phrase in the subject position 
will pose a challenge to the conscientious speaker – she will always be in violation of at 
                                                 
28 I would like to thank Zoltan Gendler Szabo for highlighting this possibility to me in the case of ill-
formed but-phrases headed by some. 
29 Korta and Perry, 2006; 8 
30 Korta and Perry, 2006; 8  
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least one of Grice’s maxims of conversation.  Before delving into the question of whether 
such violations could actually affect the distribution of DPs in this construction, let us 
first take a closer look at the interpretative possibilities for sentences with both well-
formed and ill-formed but-phrases in the subject position.  
 
2.3  But-phrases and the Conversational Maxim of Quantity 
 
  As an initial point of comparison, let us begin by looking at the various 
interpretations that are possible for a simple sentence in which the initial subject is a but-
phrase headed by a positive universal determiner such as (79): 
 
79.  Every student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
Of the possible models against which this sentence could be evaluated, two need to be 
removed from consideration at the outset.  The first is one in which the name ChiSook 
fails to refer.  For such a model, I do not think we have clear intuitions about whether 
(79) is true or false.  The second is one in which there are no students.  Interpreting (79) 
under these conditions appears to suffer from the same defect.   
  Of the remaining models, we are left with two main interpretative possibilities: 
those in which (79) is false and those in which (79) is true.  There are three main types of 
models that will render (79) false.  The first is one in which ChiSook smokes.  As she is 
not an exception to the main claim, her ‘subtraction’ from the set of students does not 
‘save’ the sentence from being false.  The second possibility is a model in which there is 
exactly one student, ChiSook, and she doesn’t smoke.  Although the Uniqueness 
Condition is met, the sentence is still false because there are no students who smoke.  The 
final possibility is one in which ChiSook is not the sole student who is a non-smoker. In 
these models, (79) is false because the Uniqueness Condition is not met. (79) is true  
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under exactly one set of conditions: there are students who smoke and the unique, 
smallest set of students who do not smoke contains ChiSook alone. 
  The distribution of true and false interpretative possibilities for sentences in which 
the subject is a but-phrase that is headed by a negative universal determiner are slightly 
different.  As before, there are two types of models that must be excluded from the 
discussion: those in which ChiSook fails to refer and those in which there are no students.  
Of the remaining models, there are two types in which (80) will be false: 
 
80.  No student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
The first is one in which ChiSook is a non-smoker.  The other is one in which there are 
more students who smoke than just ChiSook, which leads to a failure of the Uniqueness 
Condition.  Analogously two types of models are consistent with the truth of (80).  The 
first is one in which ChiSook is the sole member of the model and is a smoker.  Note the 
difference in acceptability of adding the following rejoinder to (80) and (79) 
 
81.  That is because she is the only student. 
 
It is fine for (80), but a non-sequitur after (79).  The other model is one in which there are 
other students, but once again, ChiSook is the sole student who smokes. 
  Now let us turn to the interpretation of sentences in which the but-phrase is not 
headed by a determiner that is universal in force.  In this case, suppose our example 
sentence is: 
 
82.  ??Some student but ChiSook smokes. 
 
As before, certain models need to be ignored: those in which ChiSook fails to refer and  
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those in which there are no students.  The models under which this sentence is false once 
again fall into three main categories.  The first are those in which ChiSook smokes.  The 
second are those in which ChiSook is the sole student in the model.  The third are those 
in which the Uniqueness Condition fails, i.e. when there is more than one student who 
does not smoke.  The sole model in which the truth conditions of this sentence can be 
satisfied is one in which there is at least one other student who smokes and the smallest, 
unique exception set contain ChiSook alone.  In other words, the conditions under which 
a sentence such as (82) is true are exactly those under which (79) is true.   
  The above observation holds for other but-phrases that are headed by non-
universal determiners.   Take at least one as another example: 
 
83.  ??At least one student but ChiSook smoke. 
 
The break-down of models is for all intensive purposes identical.  The conditions under 
which this sentence is false include the usual suspects: those in which ChiSook fails to 
refer, ChiSook is the sole student and is a non-smoker, or those in which the Uniqueness 
Condition fails.  The sole model in which (83) is true is one in which there are at least 
two students, including ChiSook who does not smoke, i.e. models in which (79) is also 
true. 
  Extending this observation to cover cases in which the head of the ill-formed but-
phrase is headed by determiners such as most or many is slightly more complicated.  
Suppose that our target sentence is (84): 
 
84.  ??Most students but ChiSook smoke. 
 
As in the previous cases, the models in which (83) is true are just those models in which  
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(79) is also true.
31  Consequently, sentences such as (83) will conform to the observed 
pattern.  But it is worth adding, that as was argued at the outset of this paper, sentences 
such as (84) may be unacceptable for the completely unrelated reason of an agreement 
clash.  Thus, although examples such as (84) are not counterexamples to my general 
claim, they may need to be handled more gingerly than examples such as (82) and (83) as 
their unacceptability may be traced to more than one source.   
  The fact that (82), (83) and (84) are true in just those models that (79) is true is 
remarkable.
32  It suggests that any attempt by a speaker to use these sentences to make a 
true utterance will result in a violation of the conversational maxim of Quantity.
33  As I 
argued, another, more informative, alternative formulation of the utterance exists, viz. 
one in which the but-phrase is headed by a universal determiner.  The other alternative is 
for the speaker to use these sentences to make an utterance that is false.  This too will 
result in a violation of a conversational maxim.  In this case, the speaker would fail to 
observe the maxim of Quality.  Thus, utterances in which the subject is an ill-formed but-
phrase have the very peculiar property of always resulting in a violation of at least one of 
Grice’s maxims of conversation. 
                                                 
31 But not necessarily the converse.  Whether (84) is true in a model with just two students, ChiSook, the 
non-smoker and one other smoker, will depend on the meaning of most. 
32   Note too that this observation does not apply to the two sub-categories of acceptable sentences with a 
but-phrase in subject position.  The conditions under which a sentence with a but-phrase headed by a 
positive universal determiner is true diverge from those in which the subject of the sentence is a but-phrase 
headed by a negative universal determiner.  Recall that the latter is true in a model in which there is exactly 
one student, i.e. ChiSook, whereas the former requires a model with at least two students. 
33 This last point may also help explain why a sentence such as,  
 
85.  *One hundred percent of the students but ChiSook smoke  
 
is unacceptable even though von Fintel’s semantic analysis predicts the opposite.  In the case of 
percentages, a substantially more informative formulation of the same sentence will usually exist, viz. one 
in which the actual percentage of students who fulfill the claim is identified.  Thus, if we suppose that the 
above sentence is uttered in a situation where there are ten students, nine of whom smoke, then it may be 
more informative to simply state (86), 
 
86.  Ninety percent of the students smoke. 
 
thereby avoiding a possible violation of the maxim of Quantity.  
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  Although suggestive, whether such a consistent violation of the conversational 
maxims could result in these sentences being rendered unacceptable is far from clear.  A 
very serious question can be raised in relation to this explanation.  Why would an 
utterance that consistently violates the maxims be unacceptable?  Conversational maxims 
can, and are often, flouted during the course of a conversation. Other utterances for which 
the maxim of Quantity is occasionally violated are not unacceptable, but stylistically 
marked. For example, it is sometimes argued that it is ‘pragmatically’ odd to utter 
sentences in which the subject is a quantifier phrase headed by every in a situation where 
there is exactly one individual (see McNally 1998 for discussion) because a more 
informative alternative exists: a sentence in which the subject is a definite description.  
Although the use of a sentence with universal subject is marked in this situation, it is not 
unacceptable.  Instead, these sentences are generally used to express irony or sarcasm. 
  In the following section, I will attempt to respond to this concern by pointing to 
yet another phenomenon in which the distribution of determiners may be influenced by 
the possibility of a violation of the conversational maxim of Quality.  This will hopefully 
add more weight to the contention that there may be a difference in the behaviour of 
utterances that consistently violate a conversational maxim, and those that occasionally 
do so.  But even with more evidence, this explanatory strategy is still incomplete.  For an 
explanation that relies on Grice’s maxims of conversation to be successful, a convincing 
response to the question of why utterances that occasionally violate the maxims are 
acceptable, while those that consistently violate them are not will be needed. 
 
3.  Only 
 
  As mentioned at the start of this paper, von Fintel (2000) makes a fleeting remark 
about the observed similarity between the DPs that are acceptable as the direct argument 
of  but and those that are acceptable in only-initial sentences.  His list includes the  
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following DPs: 
 
 
87.  Only ChiSook smokes. 
88.  Only the student smokes. 
89.  Only two students smoke. 
 
 
The list is, however, incomplete.  The first change that is necessary is the addition of 
indefinites.  As the data discussed in relation to but-phrases demonstrates, indefinites may 
be the argument of but: 
 
90.  Every student but a blockhead  
 
And as expected, they are also licit in only-initial sentences: 
 
91.  Only a student (in my class) smokes. 
 
With the addition of indefinites, the DPs that are acceptable in only-initial sentences and 
as the argument of but – proper names, definites, indefinites, and cardinals – are identical.  
There is, consequently, some reason to believe that there is a connection between these 
two constructions. 
  The one distinction between these two distribution patterns is that range of 
acceptable DPs in only-initial sentences can be further expanded if an explicit contrast is 
made between the determiner in the only-initial sentence and an alternative: 
 
92.  Did every student attend the talk? 
93.  No.  ?Only most students attended the talk. 
 
94.  Did some students attend the talk? 
95.  No.  ?Only every student attended the talk. 
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Although there is some clear variation in the acceptability of these sentences, e.g. (95) 
strikes me as somewhat ironic whereas (93) does not, DPs headed by determiners such as 
every and most cannot be completely discounted. 
  Thus there are two distinct questions that can be raised about the semantic relation 
between only-initial sentences and but-phrases.  The first is what motivates the nearly 
identical distribution pattern of DPs in these two constructions.  The second is what 
allows only-initial sentences to deviate from the core set of categories in certain restricted 
cases.  In what follows, I will attempt to answer each of these questions in turn.  As 
before, I think that the answer to the first question can be traced to type theory.  Proper 
names, indefinites, definites and cardinals are compatible with a wide range of types.  In 
this case, the two salient denotations are of type <e> and type <et>.  DPs whose base 
denotation is of type <<et>,t> are generally unacceptable in only-initial sentences. The 
sole exception to this claim is when an explicitly contrasting DP of type <<et>,t> is 
provided in the course of a conversation.  The explanatory strategy I will adopt of both of 
the general ban on DPs of type <<et>,t> and the existence of the exceptions will draw 
from the above observations about the interaction of these sentences with conversational 
maxims. 
 
3.1  The Semantics of Only 
 
  Rooth (1992) argues that only is a focus-sensitive adverb; focus is a feature that is 
marked on a syntactic phrase of a sentence and requires both a semantic and pragmatic 
interpretation.
34  A sentence containing only expresses a proposition that is asserted to be 
true, and depending on the analysis, either asserts or implies that it is the sole true 
                                                 
34 Rooth, 1997; 271  
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proposition in relation to a set of alternatives.  In this discussion, it will be assumed that 
the second claim is asserted and not implied.  The semantic interpretation, consequently, 
must include a variable that ranges over these alternative propositions.  The alternatives 
are derived by removing the focused element in the sentence and replacing it with a 
variable.  The possible values for the variable are contextually determined.  So for 
example, in the case of a sentence such as (96) where the noun is focused, the alternatives 
would be derived from a sentence such as (97), where x is the variable: 
 
 
96.  Only some [students]F attended the talk. 
97.  Some x attended the talk. 
 
 
(96) asserts that the proposition it expresses is true, and supposing a certain context of 
utterance, all alternatives of the form some professors attended the talk and some 
administrators attended the talk are false. 
 An  only-initial sentence that has a noun in focus expresses a statement about the 
identity of the individuals under discussion.  In contrast, an only-initial sentence which 
has the determiner in focus expresses a statement about quantity.  The difference between 
these two interpretations can be brought out by explicitly asking a question about either 
identity or quantity.  As expected, the felicity of the response depends on the position of 
the focus: 
 
 
98.  Who attended the talk? 
99.  Only two [students]F attended the talk. 
100.  ??Only [two]F students attended the talk. 
 
101.  How many students attended the talk? 
 
102.  ??Only two [students]F attended the talk. 
103.  Only [two]F students attended the talk. 
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A sentence in which the complete noun phrase two students is focused appears to be 
compatible with either interpretation.  This fact bears directly on the exceptions noted 
above and will be discussed further below.
35 
  As the previous section mentioned, what binds proper names, definites, 
indefinites and cardinals together is that they are compatible with a wide range of type 
assignments.  In addition to a denotation of type <<et>,t> and type <et>, these four 
categories of expressions are also compatible with a denotation of type <e>. 
  The fact that only-initial sentences are generally compatible with expressions that 
are extremely flexible in their type assignment suggests that the restriction is type based.  
In this case, however, the relevant types do not appear to be <et> and <<et>,t> as they 
were for the complement of but.  Instead, the data seems to suggest that only-initial 
sentences are restricted in their compatibility with DPs that have a denotation of type 
<<et>,t>.  In the majority of contexts, the denotation of a DP in an only-initial sentence 
must either be of type <e> or type <et>.  Although I lean towards restricting the 
denotation of this DP to type <e>, I will leave open the question of whether the relevant 
denotations are type <e>, type <et>, or both.  As proper names, definites, indefinites and 
cardinals easily meet this restriction and other DPs do not, they are the sole expressions 
that are generally acceptable in only-initial sentences. 
  I think that we can find the motivation for this general restriction on DPs with a 
base denotation of type <<et>,t> (and its exception) by looking at the interaction of only-
initial sentences that contain a DP of type <<et>,t> with the conversational maxim of 
Quality.  Specifically, we will examine the interaction of an only-initial sentence that 
                                                 
35 This difference in meaning also explains some variation in the acceptability of DPs from the core set.  
For example, definites are not an acceptable answer to questions that require a cardinal response, and thus 
are unacceptable in situations where the determiner is focused: 
 
104.  How many students attended the talk? 
105.  ??Only [the]F students attended the talk. 
 
Although this variation exists, I will continue to treat proper names, definites, indefinites and cardinals as 
the class of DPs that are acceptable in only-initial sentences.  
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contains a DP with a denotation of type <<et>,t> that expresses a statement about 
quantity with this maxim. 
 
3.2  Only-initial Sentences and the Conversational Maxim of Quality 
 
  Suppose that during a fairly bland conversation about a talk in the lounge of a 
philosophy department someone asks: 
 
106.  How many students attended the talk? 
 
If another person were to reply with an only-initial sentence in which the DP whose sole 
denotation is of type <<et>,t>, it would be necessary for either the determiner to be in 
focus, or alternatively, the whole noun phrase.  In either case, the context would need to 
supply a set of alternatives in which the determiner is replaced.  But a context of 
utterance is ill-equipped to handle this task; there is no tacit agreement about what 
determiners are salient, and hence no clear set of alternatives.
36  Thus an answer such as 
(106) might include (107) among its set of alternative propositions: 
 
 
107.  ??Only [most]F students attended the talk. 
109.  Some students attended the talk. 
 
 
Most students attended the talk entails that some students attended the talk.  According to 
                                                 
36 DPs headed by cardinals such as one, two etc. do not seem to have this problem.  There appears to be an 
implicature associated with only-initial sentences that the number of individuals denoted by the DP is 
smaller than expected: 
 
108.  Only [six]F students attended the talk. 
  
The relevant set of alternatives appears to contain propositions in which the cardinal heading the DP is 
higher than six, i.e. seven students, eight students.  If this is indeed how the set of alternatives is chosen, 
then an utterance of a sentence of this type will not necessarily run afoul of one of Grice’s maxims.  
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Rooth’s semantic analysis of only, (107) is false whenever (109) is included among the 
set of alternatives.  Or it might not.  There is simply no way in which to identify the 
salient set of alternatives, and thus no reason for the speaker to believe that what he has 
uttered is in fact true.  A speaker who attempts to respond to (106) with (107) in the 
above context will be unable to observe the conversational maxim of Quality.  He may 
try to make his contribution true, but he is far from guaranteed any success. 
Fortunately, there is a solution at hand for the speaker who wishes to use (107): 
restrict utterances of these sentences to contexts where the choice of alternatives is 
carefully delimited. The provision of an explicit alternative during the course of a 
conversation exploits this fact and makes the evaluation of the truth or falsity of an only-
initial sentence substantially easier.  If the truth of a sentence that contains a DP headed 
by the alternative determiner is not entailed by the answer, then the only-initial sentence 
will also be true.  (93) is an example of this interpretative strategy.  In contrast, (95) is 
clearly false. The alternative provided by the discourse, some, leads to a situation in 
which the sole member of the set of alternatives, some student attended the talk, is 
entailed by the original sentence, every student attended the talk.  With this information 
at her disposal, the speaker is in a much better position to either try and make her 
contribution to the conversation true, or as appears to be the case in (95), flout the maxim 
for ironic or sarcastic effect. 
Thus, the restriction on DPs with a denotation of type <<et>,t> in only-initial 
sentences may be motivated by the manner in which utterances of these sentences interact 
with the conversational maxim of Quality.  The explicit provision of an alternative 
appears to improve the acceptability of these sentences – an observation that fits well 
with the claim that the problem with these sentences is pragmatic in nature.   
One residual problem with this explanation is that although it is only the quantity 
interpretation of these sentences that pose a challenge to this maxim, all DPs with a base 
denotation of type <<et>,t> are ruled out.  A possible explanation of this fact is that an  
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only-initial sentence in which the complete noun phrase carries the feature of focus is 
compatible with both interpretations, leading to the need to ban the whole category of 
DPs to avoid those interpretations that cause problems for our conversational maxim.  
Without more proof, I will not insist on this point, concluding that this data provide 
suggestive, but not definitive evidence that the distribution of DPs in certain 
constructions may be influenced by Grice’s conversational maxims. 
 
 3.3 Conclusion 
 
  There are two broad conclusions that can be drawn from a comparison of the 
distribution of DPs in but-phrases and only-initial sentences.  The first is that the striking 
similarity in the choice of complements for but and as the subject of only-initial sentences 
finds its roots in type theory.  Both of these constructions appear to restrict the type of 
their complement, although not in exactly the same way.  The complement of but must be 
a DP that is compatible with a denotation of type <et> and type <<et>,t>, while the DP of 
an only-initial sentence is restricted in the majority of contexts to an expression that has a 
denotation of either type <e>, type <et>, or perhaps both.  Proper names, definites, 
indefinites and cardinals fit the bill in each case, leading to a very similar distribution of 
DPs in these two constructions.   
With a better grasp on the types associated with these expressions in each of these 
constructions, a second, and perhaps more interesting, similarity appears: but-phrases and 
only-initial sentences also share an idiosyncratic restriction on DPs whose base 
denotation is of type <<et>,t>.  In each case, I have attempted to argue that the problem 
may be the interaction of utterances of these sentences with two common conversational 
maxims: both Quantity and Quality in the case of utterances containing but-phrases and 
just Quality in the case of utterances of only-initial sentences.  Although this pragmatic 
explanation of the distribution of DPs in these two constructions is promising, it suffers  
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from a major drawback.  It is unclear why sentences whose use would consistently flout a 
maxim of conversation are ruled out, whereas such behaviour for other utterances only 
results in them being stylistically marked, or limited to ironic or sarcastic uses.  Thus, 
what is still needed, and well beyond the scope of this discussion, is a more 
comprehensive theory about the interaction of conversational maxims with our judgments 
about the acceptability of sentences – a theory that will hopefully confirm the intriguing 
possibility that the distribution of DPs in but-phrases and only-initial sentences is, in fact, 
due to violations of Grice’s maxims of conversations.  
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Chapter Four: 
Silent Opposition 
 
 
0.  Introduction 
 
Williamson (2003) claims that the position of restricted quantification is so 
incoherent that its defenders, the  generality relativists, are unable to state their own 
position without assuming the very thing that they are denying: unrestricted 
quantification.  To show that this is indeed the case, he derives a contradiction from 
nothing more than a simple statement of the generality relativist’s position, unremarkable 
truth conditions and some basic rules of logic.  From, 
 
1.  I am not quantifying over everything. 
 
It is possible to infer, 
 
2.  Something is not being quantified over by me. 
 
Let us suppose that (2) is true.  The truth of the statement would probably depend on a 
semantic clause of the following type, where we replace the predicate is not being 
quantified over by me with F: 
 
3.  ‘Something Fs’ is true as uttered by s at t if and only if something over which s 
is quantifying at t satisfies ‘Fs’ as uttered by s at t. 
 
and 
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4.  Something satisfies ‘is not being quantified over by me’ as uttered by s at t if 
and only if it is not being quantified over by s at t. 
 
which gives, 
 
5.  Something over which the generality relativist is quantifying at t is not being 
quantified over by the generality relativist at t.
1 
 
(5) is a clear contradiction, and according to Williamson, a good indication that there is 
something very wrong with the generality relativist’s position. 
  Williamson explores a couple of possible responses to this paradox.  The most 
promising solution that he suggests is to incorporate a reference to the context of 
utterance in the truth conditions.  Suppose that the generality relativist uttered (1) and it 
was interpreted as (6), where C* refers to a context of utterance that subsumes the 
original context of utterance C: 
 
6.  ‘Not everything is quantified over in C’ is true as uttered in C*. 
 
(6) solves the paradox, but at a price.  The generality relativist must be willing to forego a 
homophonic account of its truth conditions within the original context of the utterance.  
Assessed in C, the right side of the bi-conditional in (7) is false: 
 
7.  ‘Not everything is quantified over in C’ is true as uttered in C* if and only if 
not everything is quantified over in C.
2 
 
And hence the homophonic account of the statement in (6) in the original context of 
utterance is false.  This failure is emblematic of Williamson’s wider concern about the 
generality relativist’s position: metalanguages that reject unrestricted quantification are 
                                                 
1  Williamson, 2003; 427-428 
2 Williamson, 2003; 430  
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incomplete and therefore, prone to failure. 
  These metalinguistic problems are very surprising since, as Williamson points 
out, the best case for the generality relativist’s position is in fact built on metalinguistic 
considerations.  Generality relativists charge that those who advocate unrestricted 
quantification, within the terminology of Williamson, the generality absolutists, fail to 
appreciate the significance of an equally important paradox: Russell’s paradox.  Russell 
posed the original dilemma with the help of set theory, but it is possible to produce a 
version of the paradox without any recourse to sets and the controversial metaphysical 
commitments that they carry.  Williamson provides just such an example.  Given a 
language L, suppose we are charged with the task of giving some interpretation (I) for L.  
All that is required of I is that for any given predicate P, and any collection of things, F, P 
must hold of all members of F: 
 
 
8.  For everything o, I(F) is an interpretation under which P applies to o if and 
only if o Fs. 
 
 
To generate a paradox, we need to introduce R, which is defined as all the objects to 
which the predicate P does not apply. 
 
 
9.  For everything o, o Rs if and only o is not an interpretation under which P 
applies to o. 
 
 
It is possible to substitute R for F in (8) and apply the definition of it in (9), to give (10): 
 
 
10.  For everything o, I(R) is an interpretation under which P applies to o if and 
only o is not an interpretation under which P applies to o. 
 
 
From (10), the following contradiction can be generated:  
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11.  I(R) is an interpretation under which P applies to I(R) if and only if I(R) is 
not an interpretation under which P applies to I(R).
3 
 
The solution that the generality relativist advocates is to accept Russell’s paradox at face 
value and reject the possibility of unrestricted quantification.  Obviously, this solution is 
of little interest to the generality absolutist.  Williamson offers an alternative: reject the 
classification of interpretations as objects.  If this were to be done, premise (10) would no 
longer be valid and the contradictory conclusion of (11) would be blocked. 
  Thus each position has its own distinct disadvantage.  In the case of generality 
absolutism, it is no longer possible to classify interpretations as objects.  As 
counterintuitive as that may seem, it pales in comparison to what the generality relativist 
must be willing to accept: the impossibility of providing homophonic truth conditions for 
all sentences in our language.  The latter option is substantially worse because it threatens 
the project of semantic theorizing – something that should be a central goal of any 
philosopher of language according to Williamson.  Given the relative disadvantages of 
each option, the choice is clear for Williamson: generality absolutism. 
  The aim of this paper is to offer a reassessment of this conclusion.  I will argue 
that Williamson’s paradox does not pose nearly the threat to the generality relativist’s 
position that Williamson contends.  It is based on the faulty assumption that the domain 
of quantification of a quantifier phrase can be determined solely in virtue of the speaker’s 
intentions.  Denying Williamson this assumption undermines the paradox and his claim 
that restricted quantification is metalinguistically costly.  The victory of the generality 
relativist is not complete, however.  She is still left with an unsettling problem: her 
position is unsayable.  She cannot maintain her commitment to restricted quantification 
and express the content of her position in a statement such as (1).  She is silenced.   
                                                 
3 Williamson, 2003; 426  
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Although this may appear to be a fate worse than what Williamson envisions for her, I 
will show that she is not alone in her difficulties. 
  Russell’s paradox poses a very serious problem to the position of the generality 
absolutist.  The best response to Williamson’s version of this paradox is to be found in 
Rayo (2006).  The solution he advocates is to require that all object languages be 
interpreted in a language of a higher-order.  This opens the door to the classification of 
interpretations as second-order terms – the solution that Williamson himself advocates – 
but more problematically, allows for the possibility of an ever ascending hierarchy of 
languages of higher and higher order.  With an ever ascending hierarchy of 
metalanguages, there is the possibility that the interpretation of certain terms will never 
end.  Instead of being occasionally trapped in silence, there are times when the generality 
absolutist cannot stop speaking. 
  Thus, it is true that each position has a distinct disadvantage, but they are not what 
Williamson claims they are.  The task of making a choice between these two positions on 
the basis of their drawbacks alone is not easy, but if we follow the advice of Williamson, 
one position edges out the other: restricted quantification.  An ever ascending hierarchy 
of metalanguages has the potential to undermine the project of semantic theorizing.   
Given the importance that this possibility is accorded in Williamson’s original argument, 
it is clear that the disadvantages of unrestricted quantification far outweigh those of 
restricted quantification, making the latter the more attractive of the two. 
  This paper is divided into three main sections.  The first presents Williamson’s 
paradox in more detail and the problem with the assumption that lies at its heart.   
Drawing from the work of Gauker (2003), I present an argument that demonstrates that 
the domain of quantification of a quantifier phrase cannot be determined by speaker’s 
intentions alone.  Although the generality relativist’s position is not paradoxical, it is still 
problematic.  The subsequent part of this section discusses her ensuing silence.  Section 
two introduces the other paradox that is the focus of this paper, Russell’s, and its costs to  
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the generality absolutist’s position.  Two solutions are discussed, Williamson (2003) and 
Rayo (2006), of which only the second succeeds.  The cost of this solution is the focus of 
the second part of this section and where I introduce the concept of an ever ascending 
hierarchy of languages.  The paper ends with a comparison of the relative costs of each 
position, which keeping Williamson’s advice in mind, leads to the conclusion that it is the 
generality relativist who has the better deal. 
 
1.  Unrestricted Quantification in Natural Language 
 
Williamson’s argument that the generality relativist assumes the very thing that 
she is denying when she utters a sentence such as (1), repeated below for convenience, 
 
12.  I am not quantifying over everything. 
 
depends on one crucial assumption about the domain of quantification associated with the 
fused quantifier phrase everything in this sentence: it is completely unrestricted.  Without 
a completely unrestricted interpretation, (12) cannot express the content of the generality 
relativist’s position.  And if (12) does not express the content of her position, then 
Williamson will be unable to derive a contradiction.  The subsequent sentence that is 
inferred from an utterance of (12), repeated as (13),  
 
  13.  Something is not being quantified over by me. 
 
could no longer be associated with the controversial truth conditions that he provides in 
(3), repeated as (14) below: 
 
 
14.  ‘Something Fs’ is true as uttered by s at t if and only if something over which  
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s is quantifying at t satisfies ‘Fs’ as uttered by s at t. 
 
 
If the domain of quantification is restricted, then there are things by definition over which 
the speaker is not quantifying and hence, no prima facie reason to believe that this truth 
condition holds in the case of a sentence such as (13).  The above truth condition for 
Something Fs, therefore, would not be fully general, and so, false.  Without this 
intermediary premise, it is no longer possible to conclude that there is something over 
which the speaker both is and is not quantifying, and so no threat of a contradiction. 
  In virtue of this fact, the generality relativist has an easy response to Williamson’s 
paradox: reject his initial assumption that the domain of quantification associated with 
everything is completely unrestricted.  Denying this claim would not only block the 
generation of the paradox, but undermine one of Williamson’s key pieces of evidence for 
his main critique of the generality relativist’s position.  Williamson is aware of this 
temptation but responds unequivocally that it is not an option for the generality relativist.
4  
According to him, the interpretation of a domain, whether restricted or unrestricted, does 
not depend on the desires of the audience, but the intentions of the speaker, and since 
Williamson intends the domain of quantification to be interpreted without restrictions, 
then the domain of quantification must be interpreted without restrictions. 
The manner in which Williamson blocks the response of the generality relativist 
makes essential use of the relation between the speaker’s intentions and the domain of 
quantification of the quantifier phrase in an utterance. But the question of whether 
speaker’s intentions are sufficient to fix the domain of quantification in an utterance isn’t 
directly relevant to the problem at hand; the disagreement between Williamson and the 
generality relativist is not about the domain of quantification in the utterance, but in what 
the utterance expresses: the proposition.  In the case of propositions, however, it is far 
from clear that speaker’s intentions alone are sufficient to determine the domain of 
                                                 
4 Williamson, 2003; 416  
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quantification of whatever is the correlate of a quantifier phrase.   
Gauker (2003) demonstrates nicely the shortcomings of Williamson’s explanation 
in the case of propositions with the following thought experiment.  He asks us to suppose 
that there is a very isolated village in which a rather unimaginative Goatherd lives.  Being 
unimaginative, he is not given to much reflection and has never considered the question 
of whether anyone exists outside of his village.  One night, the whole village witnesses a 
falling star.  The Goatherd describes his thoughts about this event with the following 
sentence: 
 
15.  Everyone saw the falling star. 
 
A few days later, we are asked to imagine another conversation between the Goatherd 
and his friend.  His friend, who is more contemplative, asks the Goatherd whether he 
thinks anyone lives beyond the hills of their village.  The Goatherd reflects on this 
question and in a fit of insight thinks ‘Yes.  There must be others who live beyond this 
village’.  He reports this particular thought with the following sentence: 
 
16.  Not everyone lives in the village. 
 
Now how are we to interpret the propositional content of these two sentences?   
According to Gauker, there appears to be a clear difference in the interpretation of the 
quantifier phrase.  (15) is about all the people in the Goatherd’s village while (16) is 
about all the people in the universe.   
  There are two manners in which we could explain this difference in the relevant 
propositional content of the two sentences.  The first would be to claim that in each case 
the quantifier phrase receives an unrestricted interpretation, i.e. everyone in the universe, 
but that the relative extension of this domain is relativized to the Goatherd’s  
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understanding of this domain.  The Goatherd, after all, lacked the relevant distinction 
between a village and the universe when he uttered (15), and therefore, from his point of 
view, the two restrictions are equivalent.  Relativized to his understanding of the relevant 
domains of quantification, the quantifier phrase in (15) could be interpreted exactly the 
same as that in (16).  There is, however, no obvious reason to relativize the interpretation 
of either proposition to the Goatherd; it is unnecessary and would raise the very thorny 
problem of how the audience manages to understand the Goatherd’s utterance if only he 
has access to the correct interpretation.    
  A more straightforward explanation of this difference in interpretation is that the 
quantifier phrase in (15) receives a restricted interpretation to those in the village, while 
the quantifier phrase in (16) does not.    If this is indeed the case, then Williamson’s 
explanation of how domains of quantification are determined is in trouble in so far as it 
applies to propositions.  Speaker’s intentions alone cannot explain the restricted 
interpretation of the quantifier phrase in (15).  The Goatherd, after all, lacked the crucial 
distinction between the village and the universe at the time of utterance of his first 
sentence.  It, therefore, would be impossible for him to restrict the domain of 
quantification of the first quantifier phrase to just those in his village.   
  Faced with this failure of speaker’s intentions, the generality absolutist could 
simply reject the initial claim that the Goatherd said something true in (15). By failing to 
restrict the domain of quantification to just those in the village, the domain of 
quantification associated with the quantifier phrase everyone includes all the people in the 
universe.  Since everyone in the universe did not see the falling star, (15) is false.  As 
attractive as this explanation may look, it faces a serious problem: it would leave the 
Goatherd unable to assert what he is thinking about the falling star.  Since the act of 
assertion requires that what is asserted be true, and the Goatherd is completely unaware 
(at the time of utterance) of the need to restrict the domain of quantification to just those 
in the village, he would be unable to make an assertion that expresses his thoughts.    
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Suggesting that the Goatherd is so deficient in his ability to communicate seems not only 
uncharitable, but rather implausible too.   
  A better explanation of this scenario is that speaker’s intentions cannot be the sole 
determinant of the domain of quantification associated with the correlate of a quantifier 
phrase in a proposition.  The interpretation is, in certain cases, influenced by the context 
of utterance. Context must also play a role in any explanation of what determines the 
domain of quantification of the correlate of a quantifier phrase in a proposition. 
  So, Williamson’s insistence that speaker’s intentions are enough to guarantee an 
unrestricted interpretation of the quantifier phrase in the generality relativist’s statement 
of her position is simply not enough.  Context must also be countenanced.  What is and is 
not part of the context of utterance
5 and how context interacts with meaning is far from a 
settled matter.  There is neither an intuitive understanding nor a functioning model of 
how context influences meaning, and therefore, no way to know whether a particular 
context is necessary for a proposition to have a completely unrestricted interpretation.   
 
1.1  The Cost of the Generality Relativist’s Position 
 
  The generality relativist is thus in a very good position to reject Williamson’s 
assurances that any statement of her position commits her to unrestricted quantification.   
He simply cannot guarantee that the quantifier phrase receives the interpretation that he 
intends.  The fact that he can’t guarantee this is enough for the generality relativist to 
remain skeptical that she is in fact as confused as he maintains.  And so, at least from the 
point of view of the generality relativist, Williamson has neither proved that her position 
leads to a paradox nor that it carries with it any particularly heavy metalinguistic costs. 
                                                 
5 So, for example, the speaker’s intentions are part of some theories of what constitutes the context of 
utterance (see Bach 1999 for one such approach) and not others (see Perry (1998) and his discussion of 
narrow context).   Nothing stated here precludes the possibility that speaker’s intentions are part of the 
context; they simply can’t be constitutive of the whole context of an utterance.  
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  With this conclusion comes a different and perhaps, equally heavy cost: the 
generality relativist cannot state her position.  As a generality relativist, she is committed 
to the claim that all uses of quantifier phrases in natural language are restricted.  This 
claim extends to the statement of her own position.  The quantifier phrase everything in 
(12) is restricted, and therefore does not carry the meaning necessary to express her 
position.  She must, in the words of Fine (2006), remain silent. 
And this is the real cost of the generality relativist’s victory: silence.   Silence is 
not a small price to pay for a commitment to restricted quantification.
6   But it is a good 
bargain if the cost of maintaining unrestricted quantification is even higher.  Deciding 
whether this is indeed the case is the focus of the next section.  Because the natural home 
of the generality absolutist is formal languages such as first-order and second-order logic, 
we will leave the fertile ground of natural language for their more austere offerings.  As 
we shall see, the haven of formal languages will allow Williamson to present a new, but 
nevertheless very familiar argument for his position: that the manner in which the 
meaning of quantifiers – terms that are related but not identical to quantifier phrases in 
natural language – is determined guarantees the possibility of an unrestricted 
interpretation.  But this time, unlike his previous attempt, his argument succeeds.  With 
the case for unrestricted quantification reconfirmed, we can then turn to the key question:  
what is the cost of this victory? 
 
2.  Unrestricted Quantification in Formal Languages 
 
  There is a very similar problem to the one posed by Williamson’s paradox in first-
order logic: the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.  This theorem demonstrates that given a 
                                                 
6 Fine (2006) provides one route out of this dilemma, but it requires the adoption of a non-standard type of 
modality.  Because I am not fully convinced by the cogency of the modality he introduces, I will not 
address his solution here.  
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model with an “all-inclusive” domain, there will be a countable set that is a sub-model 
that is indistinguishable from the given model: 
 
 
 
Suppose, for reduction ad absurdum, that our usage picks out a unique intended 
model for our language, and that this model has an all-inclusive domain.  The 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that there is a countable set S such that we 
get an elementary submodel of the intended model when we restrict the domain to 
S.  There isn’t anything in our thoughts and practices in virtue of which the so-
called intended model fits our intentions in using the language better than the 
countable sub-model, so that there isn’t anything that makes unrestricted 
quantification, rather than quantification over S, the intended meaning of the 
quantifiers.
7 
 
 
Thus, although we may intend that an interpretation be relative to a model in which the 
domain is completely unrestricted, we cannot guarantee that it is.  There is always the 
possibility that our interpretation is in fact relative to the restricted, but indistinguishable 
sub-model.  Thus, in first-order logic, just as in natural language, it is not possible to 
guarantee that a statement containing a universal quantifier is interpreted relative to an 
unrestricted domain. 
  The challenge posed by the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is just a formal variation 
of the same epistemological problem that animated the discussion in the previous section: 
how can we guarantee that our words mean what we think they mean?  In the case of the 
interpretation of quantifier phrases in natural language, the answer that Williamson 
pursued was a theory of meaning that depended solely on the speaker’s intentions.  If it 
were the case that the speaker’s intentions were sufficient to determine the meaning of a 
given quantifier phrase, then Williamson would have been able to guarantee that the 
phrase in (1) received the interpretation that he wanted.  But as we saw, this was not to 
be.  The domain of quantification associated with a quantifier phrase cannot be 
                                                 
7 McGee, 2006; 185  
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determined by intentions alone. 
  Although Williamson’s response fails, his strategy is sound.  With a better theory 
of how meaning is determined, he would have been able to defend his paradox and bring 
the argument with the generality relativist to a sudden end.  It is not surprising to see 
Williamson reprise this strategy in a related, but later paper, Williamson (2006).  A key 
difference this time is that his discussion of unrestricted quantification is limited to the 
confines of formal languages such as first-order logic and second-order logic – languages 
that have the distinct advantage of being substantially less complex than natural 
language.  Accordingly, they place fewer demands on explanations of how the meaning 
of a term is determined.  Williamson takes advantages of this feature of formal languages 
and argues that it is harmless to assume that the meaning of a term is just its extension.  
Such an assumption would be unwarranted in the case of natural language because a 
purely extensional theory of meaning is unable to distinguish between terms with the 
same extension but different senses.  Williamson illustrates this problem with the rather 
whimsical examples of cat who licks all and only those cats who do not lick themselves 
and mouse who is not a mouse.
8  Both of these expressions have the same extension, viz. 
the empty set, but clearly different senses.  Even if we were to restrict our attention to 
terms in natural language that are plausible correlates to the logical constants of a formal 
language, it is clear that an extensional theory of meaning would still be inadequate to 
capture certain aspects of their meaning. One example is the connective if in English.  It 
often appears to imply a causal connection between the antecedent and consequent – a 
connection that could not explained in a purely extensional theory.
9  The more limited 
                                                 
8 Williamson, 2006; 370 
9 A more appropriate example of this problem may be the differences in meaning of the terms each, any, 
every and all in English.  Although all of these expressions are plausibly correlates of the universal 
quantifier in a formal language, and hence candidates for an interpretation that relies on similar rules of 
inference that Williamson identifies for the first-order logic symbol ∀, there are aspects of their meaning 
that cannot be captured solely in virtue of their extension (for a discussion of the differences in meaning of 
these terms, please see Vendler (1962)).  Thus, the different requirements that a theory of meaning must 
fulfill for universal quantifiers in English and that for formal languages means that the arguments presented  
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vocabulary of a formal language makes these problems easier to contain, and so, easier to 
ignore. With this caveat in place, Williamson is in a much better position to execute his 
strategy and as advertised, end his argument with the generality relativist. 
  Williamson claims that a good candidate to explain what logical terms mean is 
our inferential practice with them.
10  In the case of quantifiers, whether first-order or 
higher, the rules of inference that determine their use are well delineated.  Because our 
interest is primarily universal quantification, it will be the only quantifier that is 
discussed.  For concreteness, Williamson provides the two rules of inference that 
uniquely characterize our use of the universal quantifier in first-order logic: 
 
 
 
∀-Introduction  Given a deduction of A from some premises, one may deduce 
∀vA(v/t) from the same premises, where A(v/t) is the result of 
replacing all the occurrences of the individual constant t in the 
formula  A by the individual variable v, provided that no such 
occurrence of v is bound in A(v/t) and that t occurs in none of the 
premises.  
 
∀-Elimination From  ∀vA one may deduce A(t/v), where A(t/v) is the result of 
replacing all free occurrences of the individual variable v in the 
formula A by the individual constant t.
11 
 
 
What distinguishes our pattern of use of these rules is our “open-ended commitment” to 
them.  We have, in the words of Williamson, a general disposition to accept these rules 
both in our current language, but more importantly, in any extension of that language.
12 
                                                                                                                                                 
in this section cannot be used to establish the possibility of unrestricted quantification in natural language, 
and hence do not affect the conclusions of the previous section.  
10  Although Williamson does not specify exactly what aspect of the meaning of a logical constant our 
inferential patterns determine, he appears to be making a relatively modest claim. Our inferential practice is 
an important, but perhaps not the unique determinant of the meaning of these terms.  As he points out, co-
extensive terms may not be synonymous, but “even simply coextensiveness excludes by far the worst forms 
of misunderstanding” (Williamson, 2006; 370).  Because it is not central to the question here, I treat 
inferential patterns as the unique determinant of a logical constants meaning. 
11 Williamson, 2006; 380 
12 Williamson, 2006; 376  
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  This final point is really the crux of Williamson’s argument.  To demonstrate that 
it is indeed the case, he offers a formal proof.  Suppose we have two first order languages 
L and L*.  The first language, L, contains the universal quantifier, ∀, while the other 
language, L*, contains the universal quantifier ∀*.  The meaning of ∀ is determined by 
the two above rules of inference.  The meaning of ∀* is determined by two similar, but 
perhaps not identical rules of inference.  Now suppose that we were interested in 
knowing whether the term ∀ has exactly the same meaning as the term ∀*.  The best 
manner to do this would be to take advantage of the fact that we have an open-ended 
commitment to the rules that determine the meaning of each of these terms.  If we can 
find a language that is both an extension of language L and an extension of language L*, 
and demonstrate that ∀ and ∀* have the same meaning in this extension, then we can 
conclude that it must have been the case that they had the same meaning in each of their 
respective languages, i.e. L and L*.  And this is exactly what Williamson does.
13  By 
combining the syntactic resources of L and L* he creates a new language, L + L*.  In L + 
L*, the meanings of ∀ and ∀* are interderivable, and hence identical.  Since their 
meaning is identical in the extended language, it must have been the case that they were 
identical in L and L* separately.  Thus, not only is the meaning of the universal quantifier 
determined in virtue of our inferential practice with this expression, but our commitment 
to this practice is open-ended. 
  If our commitment to the inferential practice that determines the meaning of 
universal quantifiers is open-ended, it must also be the case that the domain of 
                                                 
13 The proof is as follows: Consider a universal quantifier ∀ in a language L governed by those rules and 
another universal quantifier ∀* in a language L* governed by exactly parallel rules, ∀*-Introduction and 
∀*-Elimination…Merge L and L* into a single L+L*, whose primitive vocabulary is the union of the 
primitive vocabularies of L and L*.  Let A be a formula of L+L* in which the individual constant t does not 
occur and no variable except v occurs free.  We reason in L+L*.  From ∀vA we can deduce A(t/v) by ∀-
Elimination.  Therefore, since t does not occur in the premise and A is the result of replacing all 
occurrences of t in A(t/v) by v, and no such  occurrence of v thereby becomes bound in A, from ∀vA we 
can deduce ∀*vA by ∀*-Introduction.  Conversely, from ∀*vA we can deduce A(t/v) by ∀*-Elimination, 
and therefore ∀vA by ∀-Introduction.  Thus, given the pooled commitments of speakers of L and L*, the 
two quantifiers are logically equivalent.  (Williamson, 2006; 381).   
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quantification associated with these terms is unrestricted.  Without an unrestricted 
interpretation, we would be unable to extend the interpretation of this term in a given 
language to any extension of that language – the defining condition of an open-ended 
commitment to this inferential practice.  Thus, we must conclude along with Williamson 
that universal quantifiers in first-order logic have an unrestricted interpretation.
14 
  A particularly nice feature of this argument is that it is not limited to first-order 
logics alone; with suitable inferential rules, it can be extended to any order of logic, 
making it general enough to respond to the question of whether quantification is 
unrestricted in formal languages.  In sum, if we accept that the meaning of universal 
quantifiers is determined in virtue of an open-ended commitment to our inferential 
practice with them, we must also accept that they have an unrestricted interpretation 
regardless of the order of language in which they are found. 
  Williamson’s explanation of how the meaning of universal quantifiers in first-
order logic is determined responds nicely to the skeptical concerns raised by the 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.
15  Although we are still committed to the conclusion that 
any model with an unrestricted domain will be indistinguishable from a (countable) sub-
model, this fact in and of itself is no longer grounds to doubt the possibility of 
unrestricted quantification.  With the addition of the observation that this argument can 
be extended to higher-order logics and the assumption that not only is unrestricted 
quantification possible, but the preferred interpretation of universal quantifiers in formal 
languages, we can ratchet up the strength of this response to the generality relativist even 
                                                 
14 Williamson raises the point that it may appear that his argument does not actually establish absolutely 
unrestricted quantification as the interpretation of ∀ in first-order logic is always carried out in relation to a 
model, which by definition, has a restricted domain of quantification.  Such a complaint, according to him, 
is unconvincing as it misses the nature of what it is to have an open-ended commitment. A far more 
challenging problem to his approach, however, is never addressed.  Namely, how a language learner could 
acquire knowledge of the denotation of a logical constant such as ∀ in virtue of the patterns of use that 
characterize its use (Gómez-Torrente, 2002).  Since I ultimately reject the position of the generality 
absolutist, I will not address this concern about his approach and extend Williamson the benefit of the 
doubt in this section. 
15 This point is due to McGee (2006).  For further discussion of both the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and 
the solution that an approach such as Williamson’s offers please refer to his article.  
  99
further.  Faced with any particular universal statement in a suitable logic, an unrestricted 
interpretation is assumed.  With this addition, skepticism about unrestricted quantification 
both in the abstract and in the concrete is roundly rebutted. 
  This proof of the existence of an unrestricted interpretation of universal 
quantifiers carries with it one important drawback:  Russell’s paradox.  A completely 
unrestricted interpretation of the universal quantifier will admit an interpretation that both 
does and does not apply to some predicate, generating a paradox.  Solving the crisis 
caused by the existence of this paradox is paramount if the generality absolutist is to 
maintain the superiority of his position to that of his opponent’s.  For the remainder of the 
paper, I will focus on two of the best solutions: Williamson (2003) and Rayo (2006). 
 
2.2  Williamson (2003) 
 
  Recall that Williamson introduced a version of Russell’s paradox that makes 
essential use of the concept of an interpretation: 
 
 
 
17.  For everything o, I(F) is an interpretation under which P applies to o if and 
only if o Fs. 
 
18.  For everything o, o Rs if and only if o is not an interpretation under which P 
applies to o. 
 
19.  For everything o, I(R) is an interpretation under which P applies to o if and 
only if o is not an interpretation under which P applies to o.   
 
20.  I(R) is an interpretation under which P applies to I(R) if and only if I(R) is 
not an interpretation under which P applies to I(R). 
 
 
According to the generality relativist, it is the assumption of unrestricted quantification 
that leads to the contradiction.  The solution that she advocates is to restrict the domain of  
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quantification associated with the fused quantifier phrase everything.  A restricted domain 
of quantification that excludes interpretations would make the substitution of an 
interpretation for the variable o in the second and third premise of the paradox 
unacceptable.
16  Thus the generality relativist is able to solve the paradox, but only at the 
cost of unrestricted quantification. 
  The generality absolutist must pursue other solutions.  Williamson favours one in 
which the real culprit of the paradox is not unrestricted quantification, but the assumption 
that interpretations are objects.  This, at first glance, is not a particularly obvious line of 
attack to pursue.  After all, the naturalness of Williamson’s version of Russell’s paradox 
depends in part on the intuitive appeal of classifying interpretations as objects.  Although 
intuitive, this impetus is nevertheless misguided. 
  Objects (or things) are defined by Williamson as follows: 
 
 
Whatever is is a thing…Whatever is basic or derived, simple or complex, is a 
thing.  Whatever can be named is a thing; so too is whatever cannot be named.  
Any value of a variable is a thing, and everything is the value of a variable under 
at least one assignment.
17 
 
A language in which the variables only range over objects is a first-order language.  For a 
term to be part of a first-order language, and hence be first-order definable, it must refer 
to an object.  According to Williamson, interpretations are not first-order definable.  They 
are not the name of something, but a type of predicate.  Predicates do not refer to objects, 
and therefore, predicate variables do not range over objects.  They are part of a second or 
higher-order language.  As terms that do not denote objects, interpretations are not an 
acceptable value for the variable o in the second and third premise of Williamson’s 
version of the paradox.  As before, the paradox is averted, but this time the assumption of 
unrestricted quantification is left untouched. 
                                                 
16 Williamson, 2003; 427 
17 Williamson, 1003; 420  
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  Although Williamson provides an alternative solution to Russell’s paradox, it 
incorporates the rather surprising claim that interpretations are predicates.  This 
classification is the source of some debate.  His justification for it is the role that these 
expressions play in defining logical consequence: 
 
 
The paradox-inducing argument of [examples 17-20] assumes that there are such 
things as interpretations, in particular the interpretations of predicate letters.  That 
assumption was justified by the need to generalize over such interpretations in a 
Tarskian definition of logical consequence.  Suppose, for example, that we are 
interested in whether ∃xPx is a logical consequence of ∀xPx.  We might stipulate 
that the predicate letter P appliesI to something if and only if it brays…
18 
 
 
The condition that Williamson stipulates for the interpretation of the predicate letter P 
would yield a conditional of the following kind: 
 
21.  If ∀xPx is trueI then ∃xPx is trueI.  
 
The question that this conditional raises is how should the subscript I be understood?  
According to Williamson, there is an obvious impulse to treat it as a referring expression 
because of the need to generalize into this position.  Generalizations require us to 
quantify over something and as natural language has a strong preference for 
quantification over things, I must denote a thing.
19   
Although the impulse is there, it must be resisted according to Williamson.  A 
closer look at the function of I in an example such as (21) reveals an expression that is 
more closely associated with predicates than nominals; the function of I is to identify the 
                                                 
18 Williamson, 2003; 452: italics added 
19 Williamson also frames this decision in terms of a mistaken belief that all quantification is first-order in 
nature.  I don’t think that this is directly relevant to the case at hand.  It has already been established that it 
is very natural to classify interpretations as objects.  Faced with the question of how to classify them in a 
new context, it is hardly surprising that we assume that they are referring expressions.  No prior 
philosophical commitment about the nature of quantification is necessary to reach this decision.  
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interpretative predicate necessary for the truth of (21).  In this case, the interpretative 
predicate identified by the subscript I is brays.  If we were to introduce another 
interpretative predicate, then a different subscript would be necessary to identify its 
contribution to a definition of logical consequence.  For example, suppose in addition to 
brays, we admit the further condition on the interpretation of the predicate P such that it 
appliesJ to something if and only if it is red.  The resulting conditional would be, 
 
22.  If ∀xPx is trueJ then ∃xPx is trueJ.   
 
In this case, as in (21), the contribution of the interpretative subscript to the definition of 
logical consequence is predicative, not nominal in character.  Thus, asked to provide an 
interpretation of P in our metalanguage, the given condition would be the following: 
 
23.  P Is an object o if and only if it brays. 
24.  P Js an object if and only if it is red.
20   
 
Thus the natural conclusion is that we are not generalizing into a nominal position, but a 
predicative one.  Interpretations are not first-order definable, and consequently, are not 
objects. 
  But is Williamson’s conclusion really as natural as he claims?  Williamson begins 
his argument with the admonishment to ignore the conventions of English within this 
context; our impulse to quantify into name position is misleading in the case of 
interpretations.  Presumably, this is because although formal languages such as first-order 
logic or its metalanguage are expressed in English, they are not English.  The conventions 
of English do not necessarily apply, and so, should not be automatically assumed.  It is 
for this reason that Williamson counsels a different methodology to establish what 
                                                 
20 Williamson, 2003; 453  
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category interpretations belong to: a careful analysis of their function. 
  The core of Williamson’s analysis of the function of interpretations is the two 
carefully constructed example sentences, (21) and (22).  On the basis of these two 
examples, he identifies the function of the targeted term within the example sentences: to 
distinguish different interpretative predicates. Since natural language generally 
distinguishes between different predicates by assigning a different phonetic expression to 
them, this too must be the manner in which interpretative predicates are distinguished.  
Thus, the best paraphrase of the contribution of the subscript I or J to the definition of 
logical consequence is one in which it is used predicatively: P Is an object… or P Js an 
object…  Hence, the classification of interpretations as predicates. 
But a question can be asked about this argument: why does Williamson assume 
that it is natural to classify expressions with the function of I and J as predicates?   There 
is nothing inherent in the function of I or J that grounds this assumption.  It is perfectly 
possible to imagine a language in which this function is uniformly assigned to 
expressions that are a member of a different category.  The response appears to be its 
intuitive plausibility – an intuition that is most certainly grounded in our own experience 
with the conventions of English.   
  So, on the one hand, Williamson counsels us to avoid the dangers of applying the 
conventions of English too rigorously in the new context of a formal language, and yet, 
helps himself to a dollop of those same conventions to show that interpretations should be 
classified as predicates.  He can’t have it both ways.  Either the conventions of English 
are a plausible guide to the correct classification of interpretations, robbing him of his 
initial justification for finding a new grammatical classification for interpretations, or the 
conventions of English are not to be trusted, leaving him with the motivation he needs for 
a new classification of interpretations, but with no evidence for their status as predicates.   
  Williamson would be much better served by attempting to establish the second-
order status of interpretations in virtue of the properties of formal languages directly  
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without any detours into the wilderness of natural language – an approach that does in 
fact have a champion, Rayo (2006). 
 
2.3  Rayo (2006) 
 
Rayo also believes that it is possible to quantify over absolutely everything.  This 
commitment to unrestricted quantification, however, brings with it some consequences 
both for the structure of formal languages and for our semantic theorizing about these 
languages.  The first important consequence of our commitment to unrestricted 
quantification is that the reference of a predicate in our formal language cannot be a set; 
an unrestricted domain of quantification precludes the formation of certain sets, and so, 
some standard predicates such as is self-identical would lack a reference.  A similar 
problem also exists for certain first-order terms.  If we assume that sets are the reference 
of plural terms, then expressions such as the self-identical things will also lack a 
reference.  This lack of reference can be solved if we assume that the reference of 
predicates and first-order terms is a plurality.  A plurality is not a set; it is the individuals 
that have the property in question.  So, for example, the reference of is an elephant is not 
the set of elephants, but the elephants themselves.
21   
  Formally, Rayo’s proposal for the condition on the interpretation of a predicate is 
an elephant can be expressed as follows:  
 
 
 
25.  ∃xx(∀y(y < xx  ↔ ELEPHANT (y)) ∧ REF (‘…is an elephant’, xx) 
  which  is  read: 
 
There are some thing – the xxs – such that: (a) for every y, y is one of the 
xxs if and only if y is an elephant, and (b) ‘…is an elephant’ refers to the 
                                                 
21 Rayo, 2006; 225  
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xxs.
22 
  
The formal description of the reference of is an elephant requires the use of second-order 
quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers that range over pluralities, and second-order predicates, in this 
case REF, that takes a plurality as one of its arguments.  Thus, the introduction of 
pluralities appears to entail a commitment to second-order terms – at least in our 
metalanguage.  
But are the second-order terms in the above interpretation a legitimate addition to 
our metalanguage?  Not all philosophers, after all, accept the validity of second-order 
formal languages.
23  Legitimacy, according to Rayo, can be defined in relation to the 
semantic properties of the language that a given expression is part of.  If we assume that 
all (legitimate) languages have a semantic structure in which each category of expression 
receives a semantic interpretation via a categorical semantics
24, then the legitimacy of a 
category is guaranteed if it is part of a language “whose semantic properties are 
accurately described by a categorical semantics employing [that category]”.
25  In other 
words, the category of expression under discussion must be part of a language that makes 
sense.  Rayo eschews an intuitive understanding of the concept of sense in favour of one 
that relies on the possibility of evidence of understanding on the part of an individual or 
linguistic community.  He provides three examples of abilities that might constitute this 
type of evidence: 
 
26.  that speakers have the ability to use assertions of sentences containing the 
disputed vocabulary to update their beliefs about the world; 
                                                 
22 Rayo, 2006; 225.  Subscripted numerals on predicates that indicate the type of variable in an argument 
place have been suppressed in order to improve readability. 
23 See Quine, 1986. 
24 Rayo defines a categorical semantics as: Every meaningful sentence has a semantic structure, which may 
be represented as a certain kind of tree.  Each node of the tree falls under a particular semantic category 
(e.g. ‘sentence’, ‘quantifier’, ‘sentential connective’), and has an intension that is appropriate for that 
category.  The semantic category and intension of each non-terminal node in the tree is determined by the 
semantic categories and intensions of nodes below it.  (Rayo, 2006; 220-21) 
25 Rayo, 2006; 222  
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27.  that speakers have the ability to use their beliefs about the world to regulate 
their assertions of sentences containing the disputed vocabulary; 
 
28. that speakers have the ability to use sentences involving the disputed 
vocabulary as part of a robust and consistence inferential practice.
26 
 
 
Thus, what is required of a defender of the interpretation of is an elephant in (25) in 
particular and of second-order logics in general, is evidence of understanding. 
  Certainly, it is possible to provide a vocabulary, interpretative rules and a 
deductive system for a second-order language.  In addition to the many examples that 
exist in the philosophical literature, Rayo provides one that is particularly well-suited for 
reference to pluralities: Limitω Languages. Limitω Languages are rather unremarkable, 
except of course that the interpretative rules and deductive axioms have been adapted (or 
omitted) to handle pluralities.
27  Is it plausible to assume that an individual could exhibit 
                                                 
26 Faced with an outright skeptic of the claim that a language category is part of a language that makes 
sense, evidence of linguistic understanding is the best response.  A weaker skeptical concern can be raised, 
however.  An individual may accept that a given language category is part of a language that makes sense, 
but claim that its semantic contribution is that of another semantic category.  For example, a skeptic may 
reject the semantic category of first-order universal quantifier in favour of an infinite conjunction of terms.  
Rayo thinks that the best way to respond to this type of skeptic is with an appeal to such concerns as 
theoretical parsimony and coherency (Rayo, 2006; 239).  
27 Both the symbols and interpretive rules are as expected with the addition of a saturation operator σ 
whose role is to transform a monadic first-level predicate into a first-level term, i.e. a term that is somewhat 
like a plural definite description: 
 
29.  ∀xx (REF (‘P(…)’, xx) ↔ REF (‘σ[P(…)’], xx)) 
  where  P  is  a  predicate. 
 
Limitω Languages also lack primitive quantifiers.  The predicate EXISTS and a negated counterpart replace 
the existential and universal quantifier respectively: 
 
30.  ∃ν(φ) ≡df Ex (σ [φ]) 
 where  ν is an arbitrary variable, φ an arbitrary formula 
31.  ∀ν(φ) ≡df ¬∃ν(¬φ) 
 
The deductive system associated with Limitω Languages is as mentioned above unremarkable except for 
the caveat that this system lacks the axiom of identity.  This axiom is dropped because of the manner in 
which Rayo’s deductive system interacts with first-level terms that lack a reference.  When a first-level 
term is empty, this system “makes any sentence of the form “P(t)” false (and its negation true), for “P” 
atomic.  It makes, for instance, ‘Zeus = Zeus’ false (and its negation true)”.  For a complete description of 
Limitω Languages please see Rayo (2006), 233-236.  
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understanding of this language?  Of course.  There is nothing to prevent us from 
assuming that these languages make sense. 
  But if Limitω Language makes sense, then it must be the case that the deductive 
system associated with it is consistent.  If it were not consistent, then our imagined 
individual would not demonstrate evidence of linguistic understanding in the form of 
“robust and consistent inferential practice” with this language.  For this reason, it must be 
the case that this Limitω Language does not fall prey to Russell’s paradox.  Since Rayo 
assumes unrestricted quantification, and therefore cannot adopt the solution of the 
generality relativist, he argues that it must be the case that for any linguistic category 
whose interpretation in a language of the same order would result in a paradox belongs to 
a language of a higher order.  
  If we apply this reasoning to Williamson’s version of Russell’s paradox
28, it is 
possible to reach the conclusion that Williamson sought.  Assuming interpretations are 
part of a language that makes sense, it must be the case that they belong to a semantic 
category of a higher order language.  If they did not, then the deductive system associated 
with the language of which they are a part would not be consistent, and the language 
would not make sense.  There is nothing inherent in interpretations that allows us to 
conclude this; rather, it is the fact that they are a semantic category that is part of a 
language that makes sense, and hence is legitimate.  
So the concept of legitimacy offers a solution to the generality absolutist for 
Russell’s paradox.  It is a solution, however, that comes at a cost: an ever ascending 
hierarchy of languages.  The decision to avoid the charge of inconsistency by classifying 
a term as part of a language of a higher order requires that the newly classified term 
belong to a category that is legitimate.  If it is not legitimate, then the language to which 
it belongs will not make sense, and the reclassification will fail to respond to the original 
                                                 
28 Rayo uses a version of Russell’s paradox that is different than Williamson’s.  In this case, the offending 
term is the predicate MEMBER.  Please see below for further discussion.  
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charge of inconsistency.  But if the language makes sense and includes a domain of 
quantification that is completely unrestricted, it too will require a solution to Russell’s 
paradox.  If we further assume, as the generality absolutist must, that there is no ‘final’ 
language, then there will be no end to the introduction of languages of higher and higher 
order.   
The possibility of an ever ascending hierarchy of languages is not welcome news 
for the generality absolutist, especially one who is interested in the project of semantic 
theorizing.  Suppose that a particularly intransigent opponent of the generality absolutist 
sought to test the viability of a semantic theory, such as a Limitω Language, that assumes 
unrestricted quantification.  Her request would be simple: the meaning of the predicate is 
a member, or in the terminology of Rayo, MEMBER.  The generality absolutist can 
oblige her request and provide an interpretation using the resources of a Limitω 
Language, but only on the condition that this predicate is classified as part of a higher 
order language than the terms to which it applies.  This is because the interpretation of 
MEMBER must be in a language of a higher order than the terms to which it applies or it 
will generate a version of Russell’s paradox in a Limitω Language.
29  So, for example, if 
the generality absolutist were to offer an interpretation of MEMBER that applies to first-
order terms, it would be necessary for him to classify it as a second-order predicate.  As 
the generality absolutist’s answer includes a second-order predicate, it is clear that he 
assumes a second-order language – a language that also includes the term MEMBER.  
However, the generality absolutist’s interpretation does not include the term MEMBER 
                                                 
29 Rayo demonstrates that if this predicate were to fall under the semantic category of a first-order predicate 
that applied to first-level terms, it would be possible to derive the following contradiction:   
 
32.  ∃ν1 ∀ν2 (¬ MEMBER (ν2,ν2) ↔ MEMBER (ν2,ν1) 
 where  v1 and v2 are variables that range over first-level terms 
 
        ( R a y o ,   2 0 0 6 ;   2 4 0 )  
 
A first-level term is the member of a first-order language that lacks non-logical vocabulary.  Please see 
Rayo (2006) for the complete derivation of this contradiction.  
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when it applies to second-order terms.  A second and different interpretation would be 
necessary to cover this particular meaning of MEMBER.  Consequently, the generality 
relativist may not be fully satisfied with this response of the generality absolutist.  From 
her point of view, it is incomplete.  After all, the generality relativist’s request was not 
limited to a first-order language; it was a request for the meaning of the MEMBER tout 
court, i.e. irrespective of the order language in which it is found.     
The generality absolutist is left with two options.  The first is to simply reject the 
further demand of the generality relativist and limit the scope of his response.  The 
problem with this approach is that it leaves at least one term, MEMBER, uninterpreted in 
some arbitrary order of language.  Because of this omission, it will impossible to provide 
the truth conditions of a sentence that contains this uninterpreted term.  This failure 
leaves the generality absolutist just as open to the charge of threatening the project of 
semantic theorizing as the generality relativist was for her (alleged) inability to provide 
homophonic truth conditions for sentences in certain contexts.  Given the singular role 
that semantic theorizing plays in deciding the relative merit of restricted and unrestricted 
quantification, this does not appear to be the route that the generality absolutist should 
take. 
The other possibility is to give into the request of the generality relativist and 
continue the process of interpretation ad infinitum.  This option does not threaten the 
project of semantic theorizing in an overt manner like the previous one, but it does raise 
its own serious concern.  The fact that the generality absolutist will be unable to complete 
the task of interpreting a term means that he will be also unable to complete the project of 
semantic theorizing.  The possibility of an incomplete semantic theory was precisely the 
threat that the generality relativist’s position posed to the project of semantic theorizing.  
Thus, it appears that incorporating an infinite interpretative loop into the generality 
absolutist’s theory will offer him little respite from the problem that an ever ascending 
hierarchy of metalanguages poses to his position.  
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In short, regardless of which choice the generality absolutist makes, he will be 
forced to cede the metalinguistic high ground to the generality relativist as long as his 
position commits him to a hierarchy of ever ascending metalanguages.  Consequently, 
even though a response to Russell’s paradox is possible, it has a rather dramatic 
drawback: it is the generality absolutist and not the generality relativist who threatens the 
project of semantic theorizing. 
       
3.  Conclusion 
 
  Williamson attempted to turn the standard debate about the viability of 
unrestricted quantification on its head by introducing his own paradox that not only 
illustrated the deeply conflicted nature of his opponent’s position, but also revealed the 
deep metalinguistic costs of it – a strategy that is usually associated with the generality 
relativists.  As was argued at length, it is a strategy that ultimately fails.  Williamson’s 
paradox incorporates the untenable assumption that the meaning of a term can be 
determined solely in virtue of the speaker’s intentions.  This explanation of how the 
domain of a quantifier is determined is too simplistic for natural language; natural 
language requires a theory that incorporates other factors such as context. Without a 
better defense of this key assumption, Williamson’s paradox unravels as too does his 
claim that the generality relativist’s position carries with it serious metalinguistic costs. 
  But even without generating a paradox, the generality relativist still runs into 
problems stating her position.  There is a deep, internal conflict between what the 
generality relativist is capable of saying and what she needs to say.  She is silenced. 
  The generality absolutist is faced with a similarly threatening paradox: Russell’s 
paradox.  Unlike Williamson’s paradox, however, this paradox does not rest on any 
obviously disputable assumptions.  It must be dealt with head-on.  In responding to the 
problem raised by Russell’s paradox, advocates of unrestricted quantification  
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demonstrate a strong preference for formal languages over natural languages.  Although 
formal languages carry with them a more relaxed standard of how the meaning of a term 
is determined, this advantage offers Williamson little help in his attempt to solve the 
paradox.  His simultaneous rejection and acceptance of the conventions of English within 
this formal context leaves him without any motivation for a much needed second-order 
interpretation of the offending category of expression within his version of the paradox – 
interpretations. 
  Rayo resolves this tension by motivating a solution to the paradox on the basis of 
the properties of formal languages alone.  The legitimacy of a given semantic category 
depends solely on it being part of a language that makes sense.  As a language that 
includes such terms as interpretations appears to make sense, the semantic category that 
interpretations belong to must be legitimate.  For this reason, we can conclude that 
interpretations are second, not first-order terms. 
  Consequently, there is a simple response to Russell’s paradox available to the 
generality absolutist, but it does not come for free.  Rayo’s argument is so powerful that it 
generates a hierarchy of formal languages that is infinite.  This ever ascending hierarchy 
of languages entails a never-ending process of interpretation in certain cases.  Regardless 
of whether he chooses to end this interpretative loop at some arbitrary point or carry it 
forth indefinitely, the generality absolutist will be unable to escape the threat of 
undermining the project of semantic theorizing. If we heed the advice of Williamson, and 
make our decision between these two positions on the narrow grounds he suggests, then 
restricted quantification has the edge. This reversal of fortune may surprise the advocate 
of unrestricted quantification, but it shouldn’t.  As Williamson points out, the case for 
restricted quantification has always been built on metalinguistic grounds.  The fact that it 
retains the advantage in this arena is to be expected, and if the generality relativist is 
correct, nurtured as the surest defense against unrestricted quantification.  
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